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Introduction
Among the many voices calling for libel law reform in recent years,'
perhaps the most powerful belongs to the Uniform Law Commissioners.
Following more than three years of debate and revisions, a specially ap-
pointed drafting committee has settled on "the basic structure" of a com-
prehensive proposal for reform3 called the Uniform Defamation Act.4
Following public hearings on the Act in October 1992, the drafting com-
mittee will prepare a final draft for adoption by the full conference of
commissioners at their annual meeting in the summer of 1993.-
While primarily drawing on the common law and incorporating cur-
rent constitutional protections, the Uniform Defamation Act ("the Act")
would revolutionize libel law through the institution of a declaratory
judgment action to restore reputation. The idea of such a "no-damages"
remedy is not new,6 but with the commissioners' machinery for institut-
ing changes in state laws,7 the Act, if it can overcome opposition of the
1. See, e.g., RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS (1987); Lois
G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRI-
VACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth
Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991); Geoffrey C. Cook, Reconciling the First Amend-
ment with the Individual's Reputation: The Declaratory Judgment as an Option for Libel Suits,
93 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1989); C. Thomas Dienes, Libel Reform: An Appraisal, 23 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 1 (1989); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel
Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986); Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keep-
ing Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988); Joan E. Schaffner, Protection
of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of
Defamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 433 (1990).
2. Formally known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
3. Telephone Interview with Randall P. Bezanson, Reporter for the Uniform Defama-
tion Act Drafting Committee and Dean of Washington and Lee University School of Law
(Apr, 2, 1992).
4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIF.
DEFAMATION ACT (Tent. Draft Feb. 6, 1992).
5. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
6. Professor Marc A. Franklin is widely credited as one of the first to propose such
reform. For his earliest writing on the subject see Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of
Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1983).
7. Each state is represented in the full conference, and individual commissioners may
introduce any act adopted by the full conference in his or her respective state legislature and
work for its passage there. In addition, the national organization provides experts to testify in
state legislatures to support such efforts. Telephone Interview with Renee Skower, Adminis-
trative Assistant for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (May
5, 1992).
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press,8 has a more realistic chance for enactment than earlier legislative
proposals. 9
The idea of a declaratory judgment action to restore reputation has
its roots in the criticism that current libel law serves the interests of no
one.10 Because of the limitations on libel actions imposed by New York
Times v. Sullivan"1 and following cases, few plaintiffs ever receive the
opportunity to restore their reputations through the legal system because
defendants prevail on seventy-five percent of their motions for summary
judgment.12 Therefore, the issue of falsity is never reached in most cases.
However, when libel cases do go to trial, the media tend to lose, and
lose big. Media libel defendants lose sixty-six percent of the time in jury
trials.13 By way of contrast, plaintiffs prevail in about half of all other
tort cases tried before a jury. 14 In product liability and medical malprac-
tice cases, plaintiffs prevail thirty to forty percent of the time." As will
be discussed in Section I of this article, the average initial jury award
against a media defendant is now in the millions.
Central to the Uniform Defamation Act's attempt to remedy some
of these problems is the premise that many libel plaintiffs "would be sat-
isfied with vindication, that is with a determination that the statement
was false." 16 Indeed, Randall P. Bezanson, Reporter for the Uniform
Defamation Act Drafting Committee, was a co-author of the landmark
Iowa Libel Research Project ("Iowa Project"), which studied cases over
a ten-year period to determine why libel plaintiffs sue and how non-litiga-
8. While the press is not happy with the current state of libel law either, at least its risks
are known. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 546-50.
9. The most widely discussed of the earlier legislative proposals are ANNENBERG WASH-
INGTON PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY STUDIES OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVER-
SITY, PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW: THE REPORT OF THE LIBEL REFORM
PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM (1988), reprinted in RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9.13 [4][a]-[c] (1992) [hereinafter ANNENBERG LIBEL RE-
FORM ACT], and H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Representative
Charles Schumer). Neither these nor any other reform proposal of the past decade has been
adopted in any jurisdiction. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 490-91.
10. See generally Anderson, supra note 1, at 488-93, 510-36.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. LDRC Study #8-Summary Judgment Motions in Libel Actions: Two Year Update
(1984-86), LDRC BULLETIN (Libel Defense Resource Center, New York, N.Y.), 1987, at 2.
13. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE: Trial Results, Damage Awards and Appeals, 1980-89
and 1990-91: The "Chilling Effect" Writ Large... Then Writ Larger, LDRC BULLETIN (Libel
Defense Resource Center, New York, N.Y.), July 31, 1992, at 3, 6 (figure includes directed
verdicts) [hereinafter LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE]. Ninety-two percent of all libel cases in
the 1980s were tried before juries. Id.
14. Juries and Damages: Comparing the Media's Libel Experience to Other Civil Litigants,
LDRC BULLETIN (Libel Defense Resource Center, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 31, 1984, at 24.
15. Id. at 25.
16. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, at 2 (prefatory note).
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tion alternatives might be used to resolve these disputes.1 7 In retrospec-
tive interviews by Iowa Project researchers, less than a quarter of
surveyed libel plaintiffs said that monetary damages was the major factor
in their initial decision to sue. Instead, the desire to restore a damaged
reputation ranked foremost.' 9
The media in general has been more responsive to the handling and
correction of mistakes in recent years.20 The Act, however, would pro-
vide further incentives to retract incorrect statements as well as penalties
for the failure to do so.
The tradeoff for the Act's action for vindication, in which defend-
ants are precluded from asserting their constitutional fault-based privi-
leges, is a limitation on damages. Plaintiffs can collect only their costs of
litigation in a vindication action.2' In an action for damages, the Act
eliminates general and presumed damages and limits the recovery of
plaintiffs who refuse to accept a termination offer to pecuniary
damages.22
Critics assert that the Act gives the press too little in return for the
uncertainties of an unproven system. Further, they question how much
the Act will actually limit damages, especially since the current version
contains an alternative provision allowing punitive damages.23
I
The Economics of Libel
The Libel Defense Resource Center ("LDRC") recently released the
results of a ten-year study of libel verdicts against the media. The study
showed that in the period from 1980-89, the average jury libel award
against media defendants was $1.47 million.24 Nearly a quarter of all
libel awards by juries during the period were for more than $1 million,
with two percent of the awards coming in at more than $10 million.25
17. See BEZANSON, supra note 1.
18. Id. at 79.
19. Id. Interestingly, the second-ranked reason for bringing suit was a desire to punish
the press.
20. Since the Iowa Project study was released, Dean Bezanson has worked with a number
of news organizations to help them improve the manner in which they handle defamation
complaints. The Knight-Ridder newspaper chain in particular has expressed to him a marked
improvement in its ability to resolve complaints at the newspaper level, before attorneys be-
come involved in the dispute. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
21. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 5 cmt. and § 8(a)(1).
22. Id. § 9(b) and cmt., § 12(b).
23. Id. § 10 and cmt.
24. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, supra note 13, at 3, 8.
25. Id.
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The amount awarded in libel actions is increasing. The average jury
award skyrocketed to more than $9 million in 1990-91.26 Indicative that
the higher average award in the 1990-91 period might not be a fluke is
that six of the ten largest defamation awards ever rendered against media
defendants have been handed down since the spring of 1990.27
Libel law is also complex. In a recent case in which the jury
awarded a $2.05 million verdict against The Washington Post,28 post-trial
discussions with jurors showed they ignored the judge's detailed instruc-
tions that actual malice must be proven, that the plaintiff had the burden
of proving falsity, and that the challenged statements were to be consid-
ered in the context of the article as a whole.29 The judge's instructions
totalled thirty-seven pages in the trial transcript, and took two hours to
read. "We never understood the instructions and never pretended to,"
said one juror.30
Jurors are many times denied use of a written version of a judge's
instructions for guidance during their deliberations, further com-
pounding confusion.3" Jury misunderstandings and misapplications of
the complex rules in libel law then need to be dealt with on appeal, which
increases defense costs.3 2
26. Id. at 4, 8. The median jury award against media libel defendants similarly increased
to $1.5 million in 1990-91, from $200,000 in the earlier 10-year period.
27. Feazell v. Belo Broadcasting, No. 86-2227-1 (Tex. Dist. Ct. McClennan County, Apr.
19, 1991) ($58 million awarded: $17 million compensatory, $41 million punitive); Sprague v.
Walter, No. 3644, 1973 Term (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. County, May 3, 1990) ($34 million awarded:
$2.5 million compensatory, $31.5 million punitive); Srivastava v. Harte Hanks, No. 85 CI
15150 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Bexar County, Apr. 10, 1990) ($29 million awarded, not including inter-
est: $11.5 million compensatory, $17.5 million punitive); Prozeralik v. Capital Cities, Inc., No.
860411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Erie County, July 10, 1991) ($18.47 million awarded: $8.47 million
compensatory, $10 million punitive); Newcomb v. Plain Dealer, No. 93757 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga County, Sept. 14, 1990) ($13.5 million awarded: $4.5 million compensatory, $9
million punitive). As reported in Follow-Up Report of the Libel Defense Resource Center on the
[Uniform] Defamation Act, LDRC BULLETIN (Libel Defense Resource Center, New York,
N.Y.), Aug. 1, 1991, at 13 [hereinafter Follow-Up Report]. Nguyen v. Nguyen (Cal. Super. Ct.
Orange County, Sept. 6, 1991) ($16 million awarded: $580,000 special, $3.5 million general,
$12 million punitive). The [Uniform] Defamation Act: An LDRC Special Report, LDRC BUL-
LETIN (Libel Defense Resource Center, New York, N.Y.), June 30, 1992, at 14.
28. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., No. 80-3032 (D.D.C. July 30, 1982),judgment
n.o.v., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983), ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.
1985), vacated in part, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc), on rehearing, 817 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
29. Steven Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, TRIAL BY JURY
13, 29-32 (1989).
30. Id. at 29.
31. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 14.10 (2d ed. 1991).
32. To counter misunderstanding and misapplication of the law, more courts are requir-
ing the use of special interrogatories in libel litigation. Id.
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Only about one-quarter of all awards against media defendants sur-
vive the post-trial and appellate process as initially entered, however.33
Most of these awards are either reversed or substantially reduced.34 The
average of all finally affirmed awards during the 1980s was $259,249. 35
At the same time, multi-million dollar awards were affirmed against me-
dia defendants for the first time.36
Nor are libel suits cheap to defend. Bruce Sanford, a First Amend-
ment attorney at Baker & Hostetler in Washington, D.C., and author of
the treatise Libel and Privacy, estimated that even a simple libel action
can cost $20,000 to defend before the case reaches trial.37 A "tenacious
plaintiff or an unsympathetic judge" can increase pretrial costs to
$500,000.38
Much of the pretrial costs in a public figure libel case are consumed
in discovery to determine whether the media acted with knowledge of a
story's falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth.39 In the protracted
Herbert v. Lando' litigation, in which CBS reportedly spent $3 to $4
million on defense costs, the deposition of CBS producer Barry Lando
continued off and on for a year and filled over 3,000 pages of transcript.4'
Costs for a suit that reaches trial can go through the roof. CBS
reportedly spent between $5 and $10 million to defend Westmoreland v.
CBS"t2 before the case was settled.43 Professor Smolla has described the
situation as follows:
What is clear from this financial portrait is that if the plaintiff's pri-
mary motive is vindication through punishment of the media defend-
ant, it is not necessary to win in order to win. If the suit can be
prolonged sufficiently[,] the mere ticking away of the defense lawyer's
clock will be enough to extract the pound of flesh.44
33. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, supra note 13, at 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Brown & Williamson v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 993 (1988) ($3.05 million award against CBS); DiSalle v. PG Publishing Co., 544 A.2d
1345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), allocatur denied, 557 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1989), and cert. denied, 492
U.S. 906 (1989) ($2.21 million award against the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette).
37. Alex Jones, Libel Threat is Increasing Even for Small Publications, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1992, at D8.
38. Id.
39. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA & POWER 67
(1986). See also Anderson, supra note 1, at 516-21.
40. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
41. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 71, 75.
42. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
43. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 75.
44. Id. at 76.
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The economic costs to mount a libel suit can be just as grim for
plaintiffs.4" Because of the difficulty of overcoming the defendant's fault
privileges and the substantial risk of having any jury award reversed or
reduced, the libel system is "effectively foreclosed" to any plaintiff who is
not wealthy or powerful.46 Although eighty percent of libel suits are
brought on a contingency basis,47 these suits "tend to wither away once
the obstacles [of libel litigation ] become clear,"'48 unless "the value of the
case lies in its visibility and the potential to represent the plaintiff
again. ' 49
The present libel system is therefore one in which three-quarters of
all plaintiffs lose on summary judgment, media defendants lose two out
of three jury trials, generally suffering large damage awards, and three-
quarters of all awards are either reversed or reduced post trial or on ap-
peal. In such a system, it is small wonder that an estimated eighty per-
cent of media defendants' libel costs are spent on attorney fees, with the
remaining twenty percent covering all affirmed jury awards and
settlements.
Many media companies carry libel insurance to help pay these
costs.5 ' However, "the insurance company is simply a clearinghouse. It
pays the bill today and increases the rates tomorrow," said Walter
Coady, whose company supplies libel insurance to the Public Broadcast-
ing System, National Public Radio and about 1,300 generally small news-
papers across the country.52 According to Mr. Coady, premiums jumped
almost one hundred percent in 1985 and another one hundred percent in
1986, following Westmoreland v. CBS53 and Sharon v. Time, Inc.,5
which cost the industry $15 million in legal fees.55 Since then, however,
rates have stabilized. 56
45. William Tavoulareas estimated the legal bill in his suit against The Washington Post at
about $1.8 million. Brill, supra note 29, at 34.
46. Randall P. Bezanson & Brian C. Murchison, The Three Voices of Libel, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 213, 222 (1990).
47. BEZANSON, supra note 1, at 148.
48. Bezanson & Murchison, supra note 46.
49. BEZANSON, supra note 1, at 148.
50. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 75.
51. However, some media companies, such as The New York Times, do not. Id. at 77.
52. Telephone Interview with Walter Coady, President, Walterry Insurance Brokers,
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20, 1992).
53. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
55. Coady Interview, supra note 52 (Mar. 2, 1992).
56. Id.
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II
Analysis of the Uniform Defamation Act
This article does not claim to distinguish all ways in which the Uni-
form Defamation Act would alter present libel law." Instead, the au-
thor's intention is to highlight the Act's central features, comparing its
substantive proposals with present law and analyzing the Act's potential
effect.
A. Vindication Actions--Changing the Emphasis From Fault to Falsity
The heart of the Uniform Defamation Act is its establishment of a
declaratory judgment cause of action as an alternative to the traditional
suit for damages. The plaintiff in the Act's action for vindication forgoes
the opportunity for monetary damages and instead seeks to clear her
name through "a written and published finding of fact on the question of
falsity.""8
In order that an action for vindication might fulfill its purpose of
determining the truth or falsity of a statement and because no monetary
damages are at stake, defendants are precluded from asserting constitu-
tional privileges based on actual malice or negligence, as well as condi-
tional privileges based on common law.59 Only a defendant's successful
raising of one of the Act's absolute privileges will bar an action for
vindication.'
A revised provision in the most recent versions of the Act offers
defendants a cost-free alternative to defending every vindication action
brought against them. If at any time within ninety days of service of
process, the defendant disclaims any assertion of truth in the statement
and agrees to publish a retraction to that effect, the court is required to
dismiss a pending vindication action following actual publication of the
57. Indeed, the Act seeks to simplify the law by making all defamations subject to the
same rules. Consequently, the Act removes all distinctions between libel and slander as well as
the rules of liability turning on the distinction. The Act also draws no distinctions based on
the media or non-media identity of a defendant. See UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4,
§ 2 cmt. Furthermore, the Act eliminates strict liability in the few instances still permitted by
U.S. Supreme Court decisions-i.e., instances of purely private libel-and states that "the re-
maining instances of strict liability ... are so narrow as to be of doubtful utility as a matter of
policy." Id. § 9 cmt. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet
v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
58. UNIF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 5 cmt.
59. Id.
60. Id. See discussion of absolute privileges in section D. I., infra.
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retraction. 61 No attorney fees or litigation costs are awarded to a plain-
tiff in this scenario.62
If, however, a defendant loses a vindication action that it chooses to
defend and has "unreasonably" refused to publish a timely retraction, the
plaintiff shall be awarded attorney fees and other litigation costs. 63 A
prevailing defendant, on the other hand, shall be awarded its attorney
fees and litigation costs only "upon proof that the plaintiff had no reason-
able basis upon which to allege falsity." 6
Because defendants can be involuntarily subjected to actions for vin-
dication and the payment of litigation costs, such a provision necessarily
raises constitutional questions. There is no clear answer regarding the
constitutionality of such a proposal, because New York Times v. Sulli-
van 65 and its progeny speak only to the issue of constitutional restraints
on damage awards.66 Justice White did give a general endorsement to
declaratory judgment actions in his concurrence to Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders, declaring that he can "discern nothing in the Con-
stitution which forbids a plaintiff to obtain a judicial decree that a state-
ment is false." 67
Furthermore, the losing defendant in an action for vindication can
choose to publish the court's findings of fact itself or pay the plaintiff a
sufficient amount to reach substantially the same audience by publishing
the findings elsewhere.6 This would seem to circumvent the First
Amendment prohibition on government intrusion into the editorial pro-
cess by compelling editors "to publish that which 'reason tells them
should not be published.' "69
61. Id. § 6.
62. Id. This provision first appeared in the Dec. 6, 1991, draft in the Comments to Sec-
tion 6. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT § 6 cmt. (Tent. Draft, Dec. 6, 1991). It was included as an
explicit provision of the Act in the Feb. 6, 1992, draft. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT § 6.
63. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 8(a)(1). In order to recover litigation ex-
penses under the most recent working version of the Act, a prevailing plaintiff must prove
"that the defendant had no reasonable basis to refuse a timely correction or clarification."
UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT § 3-104(a)(1) (Tent. Draft, Oct. 21, 1992 (1/05/93 Revision)).
64. Id. § 8(a)(2). The Comment to Section 8 explains that this provision was included as
a tradeoff to defendants for their only being permitted to claim absolute privileges as a bar to
vindication actions and to deter plaintiffs from bringing frivolous vindication actions. Id. § 8
cmt.
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-50 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S.
749, 755-61 (1985).
67. 472 U.S. at 768 n.2 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
68. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, §§ 7(a), 15(b)(l).
69. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (quoting Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945)).
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Nevertheless, a media defendant who wishes to stand behind the
truth of its story could be subjected to substantial costs in an action for
vindication. That is because the "reasonable expenses of litigation" that
the prevailing plaintiff can recover are "intended to be inclusive of all
costs of litigation."70 This broad standard includes not only the recovery
of attorney fees and costs, but also the expenses associated with wit-
nesses, experts, travel, and so forth.71
Critics contend that such costs would be akin to damages, especially
under their assertion that the costs of vindication actions would not be
insubstantial. Sandy Baron, former Senior Managing Attorney for NBC,
terms it "a fallacy" that trials to determine truth or falsity will necessar-
ily be less expensive than the current fault-based system.72 Baron cited,
as examples of obstacles in the path of determining truth, the problems
posed by confidential sources and documents upon which the reporter
relied, but to which the parties do not have access.7 a
In addition, most libel litigation does not concern clear, objective
factual inaccuracies, according to Henry Kaufman, General Counsel for
the Libel Defense Resource Center.74 Those sorts of statements are usu-
ally voluntarily resolved. Problems generally concern "all of the other
dicey, opinionated conclusions or implications of the facts" published or
broadcast by the media.75
"The cases that get litigated are when the plaintiff says, 'You really
said more about me than you will admit to, and I want to use this as an
occasion to eliminate all of the questions and implications that arise out
of [those] true facts,'" Mr. Kaufman explained. Litigation then results
from the impasse over the press's "good faith inability to correct or re-
tract what the plaintiff overambitiously wants to correct or retract. '76
Even Dean Bezanson concedes the assertion that an award of litiga-
tion expenses would be akin to damages is "certainly ... not.., beyond
reasonable grounds for argument. ' 77 He does not believe such an argu-
ment would prevail, he said, because the Supreme Court has always been
70. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 8(a)(l) and cmt.
71. Id.
72. Telephone Interview with Sandy Baron, former Senior Managing Attorney for NBC
(Mar. 26, 1992). Ms. Baron was also a member of the Annenberg Libel Reform Project.
73. Id. In order for a retraction to be considered sufficient under § 15(b)(2)(iii) of the
Act, it must identify the source of any statement attributed to another person, even if the
original publication did not do so. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 15 cmt.; see also
infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
74. Telephone Interview with Henry Kaufman, General Counsel for the Libel Defense
Resource Center (Mar. 5, 1992).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
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careful to draw a distinction between the award of monetary damages
and other remedies in fashioning the fault-based privileges. The award of
litigation costs to a winning party has never been considered a constitu-
tional problem, he added.7
Professor Rodney Smolla was director of the Annenberg Libel Re-
form Project, which released its reform proposal in October 1988.79 In
that proposal, either party could force the other into a declaratory judg-
ment action.80
"I've gone 'round and 'round on this, but my view now is that this
ought not be done," Professor Smolla said. "I would prefer to see that
section of the Act be something that can only be triggered if both parties
agree to it."8"
Professor Smolla surmised that a forced vindication action might
pass muster if the Act overall were as speech protective as the current
constitutional minimums. However, "It's hard for me to read the Act as
drafted and say that this is as good a deal for the media as New York
Times v. Sullivan," he said. 2
Another potential problem, some critics contend, is that a vindica-
tion system could increase the number of libel suits brought against the
media. 3 Indeed, the very purpose of a declaratory judgment system is to
open up the legal system to plaintiffs who would be foreclosed from ob-
taining relief under the current fault-based system. 4 On this point of
increased litigation, one generally pro-reform commentator writes:
A declaratory judgment remedy ... might enmesh the media, or par-
ticular media outlets, in many minor-league lawsuits over inaccuracies
that today go unchallenged. There are media antagonists, both na-
tional and local, who would happily avail themselves of new opportu-
nities to bedevil the media they dislike.8 5
78. Id.
79. ANNENBERG LIBEL REFORM ACT, supra note 9.
80. See id. § 4(a), (e).
81. Telephone Interview with Rodney A. Smolla, Professor and Director of the Institute
of Bill of Rights Law at the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law
(Mar. 31, 1992). Professor Smolla is also the American Bar Association's Advisor to the Uni-
form Defamation Act Drafting Committee.
82. Id.
83. Kaufman Interview, supra note 74; Telephone Interview with Ren6 Milam, Manager
of Legal Affairs for the Newspaper Association of America (Mar. 2, 1992).
84. See Bezanson & Murchison, supra note 46, at 215-16, 224.
85. Anderson, supra note 1, at 546. Such lawsuits might also be used to stifle debate,
according to one participant at the drafting committee's October 1992 public hearing. As
editor of the small Journal of Medical Primatology, J. Moor-Jankowski, M.D., published a
letter criticizing a multinational pharmaceutical company's use of wild chimpanzees for infec-
tious medical studies in Africa. The result was a seven-year lawsuit, costing him over $1
million to win, over the truth or falsity of the letter. Dr. Moor-Jankowski questioned what
would have happened if cigarette and asbestos companies had used libel laws to stifle debate
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Whether the declaratory judgment scheme envisioned by the draft-
ing committee could. withstand constitutional scrutiny is, therefore, an
open question. Indeed, it could be argued that a system that forces vindi-
cation actions upon defendants violates the intent of New York Times v.
Sullivan 6 to provide sufficient breathing room for a free press. That is
because would-be critics "may be deterred from voicing their criticism
[on matters of public concern], even though it is believed to be true and
even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved
in court or fear of the expense of having to so do.""7
"You can't verify the truth of each statement contained in a story to
the nth degree and still meet your deadline, especially when you're deal-
ing with public figures," said Ren6 P. Milam, Manager of Legal Affairs
for the Newspaper Association of America."8 "The effect of that could
be to just nix the entire story and chill the news gathering process. '89
B. Action for Damages-Limiting Recoveries
The tradeoff for the action for vindication is a limitation on damage
awards. The Act forecloses general or presumed damages as well as re-
covery for "pure" emotional distress.9" It does this by explicitly limiting
recovery to "damages for harm to reputation and resulting emotional
distress; and pecuniary damages caused by the publication." 91 In requir-
ing that damages for emotional distress result from harm to reputation,
the drafters' intent is "to limit the scope of emotional distress damages
recoverable."'92 The Act defines pecuniary damages as "provable eco-
nomic loss" or "out-of-pocket losses."'93
The Act permits a defendant to limit damages by making a termina-
tion offer in which he agrees to publish a retraction and pay the plaintiff's
attorney fees and other litigation expenses. A plaintiff who does not ac-
cept the offer is limited to pecuniary damages and may not recover attor-
over the first tentative findings on their products. J. Moor-Jankowski, M.D., Research Profes-
sor of Forensic Medicine and Director of the Laboratory for Experimental Medicine and Sur-
gery in Primates at New York University Medical Center, Testimony before the Uniform
Defamation Act Drafting Committee, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 9, 1992). See also Immuno AG
v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
86. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
87. Id. at 279.
88. Milam Interview, supra note 83.
89. Id.
90. UNIF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 9 cmt.
91. Id. § 9(b)(1), (2).
92. Id. § 9 cmt.
93. Id. §§ 1(2), 9 cmt.
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ney fees and other litigation expenses.94 This provision is analogous to
the damage limitation provisions of retraction statutes in many states.95
In an action for damages, attorney fees and other litigation expenses
"may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff who made an adequate request
for retraction within sixty days of publication," and who proves that the
challenged statement was published with actual malice.96 However,
there is no provision made to award attorney fees to defendants in a dam-
ages action.
Much of this makes sense in the abstract. However, the practical
question remains to what extent it would actually limit damages.
A recent case, Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies,97 illus-
trates the difficulties in limiting jury awards even when general or pre-
sumed damages are eliminated and "proof of reputational harm" is
required before a recovery for emotional distress may be obtained. The
case concerned a silver dealer who was allegedly libeled by a series of
broadcasts investigating whether an antique candelabra he had sold to a
museum was stolen and overpriced. At least $1.8 million of the $2.3
million jury award would appear to be recoverable under the Act as
proven injury to reputation or emotional distress; the presumed injury to
personal reputation would be excluded under the Act.98
Weller offered no hard data to quantify his losses, and indeed proved
no special damages.99 In upholding the $800,000 portion of the award
attributable to "proven injury" to the reputation of Weller and his busi-
ness, the California Court of Appeal noted that Weller "did not offer the
direct testimony of any customer or potential customer who refused to
do business with him or [his company]," but instead provided "through
his own testimony, evidence of statements made by potential customers
that tended to prove injury to his reputation.""lc ° The $1 million claim
94. Id. § 12.
95. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 9.12[2][b].
96. UNIF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 11. This provision is removed from the
most recent working version of the Act. See UNIFORM DEFAMATION AcT, Article II (Tent.
Draft, Oct. 21, 1992 (1/05/93 Revision)).
97. 283 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Ct. App. 1991). The analysis of this case is borrowed from Fol-
low-Up Report, supra note 27, at 13-15.
98. The jury award had the following components:
$1 million "for mental suffering";
$500,000 "for proven injury to [personal] reputation";
$300,000 "for proven injury to [corporate] reputation"; and
$500,000 "for presumed injury to [personal] reputation."
283 Cal. Rptr. at 648-49.
99. Id. at 659. The plaintiff alleged no personal pecuniary losses.
100. Id. at 658.
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for emotional distress was supported only by Weller's own testimony as
to his anger, depression, embarrassment, and humiliation.101
The problem in such cases has been characterized by Professor
Smolla:
[U]nlike other forms of personal injury litigation, in which the award
of damages is tied at least to some degree to quantifiably measurable
forms of loss-medical bills, lost wages, or diminished future earning
power-the lawsuit for libel ... is one of the most unusual creatures
known to the legal world. The wrong inflicted on the victim is a sub-
jective loss of reputation... triggered solely by the spoken or written
word; on the mere basis of what has been said about a victim, a jury is
instructed to employ a sort of alchemy to transform the intangible
"damage to reputation".. . into cold dollars and cents.10
2
The Libel Defense Resource Center has suggested that even with the
Act's proposed damage limitations, it would not prevent "the imposition
of 'compensatory' awards punitive in size if not intent."' 03 During the
1980s, the compensatory component of libel awards by juries averaged
$554,796.104 Furthermore, the compensatory portions of six "mega-
awards" handed down against media defendants in the past three years
ranged from $2.5 million to $17 million and averaged over $8 million. 15
The problem of excessive awards would not be remedied under the
Act because plaintiffs would only need to prove damages "with reason-
able certainty."" The LDRC goes on to say:
At a minimum, given the largely indeterminate nature of "harm to
reputation" and attendant "emotional distress," compensatory dam-
ages must be based on "clear and convincing" evidence of actual in-
jury. Such a higher standard of proof, while no guarantee of the
elimination of all excessive awards, at least would have the salutary
effect of... requiring defamation plaintiffs to adduce and particularize
some concrete evidence of their damages, rather than relying on gener-
alized appeals to the sympathy-if not to the passion and prejudice-
of the jury.10
Dean Bezanson countered that reasonable certainty is the "uni-
form" standard for proof of damages in U.S. tort law."0 ' The U.S.
Supreme Court has instructed that awards for actual injury in libel cases
101. Id.
102. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 73.
103. Follow-Up Report, supra note 27, at 13.
104. LDRC Recap and Update, supra note 13, appendix A (based on average of 139 listed
jury trials in which compensatory damages were separated out).
105. See supra note 27 for a list of the cases and the award amounts.
106. Follow-Up Report, supra note 27, at 16; UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4,
§ 3(3).
107. Follow-Up Report, supra note 27, at 16.
108. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
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must be supported by "competent evidence ... although there need be no
evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury."'"
A larger problem, at least in terms of garnering media support for
the Uniform Defamation Act, is that the Act does not contain an out-
right ban on punitive damages. "10 After wavering on the issue, the draft-
ing committee settled on a bar on punitive damages in its August 1991
draft. At its annual meeting, however, the conference as a whole de-
clined to follow that recommendation and instructed the drafting com-
mittee to include a provision allowing punitive damages "so they could
revisit the issue at [the Act's] final reading.""'
There was "a fair division of opinion in the Conference about the
wisdom of eliminating punitive damages, at least in some cases," ex-
plained Dean Bezanson. 1 2 He described the alternative, permitting pu-
nitive damages, as "exceedingly narrow." In it, a plaintiff must prove
both knowledge of falsity and ill will by clear and convincing evidence." 13
"Having to prove both of those things by clear and convincing evidence
is a hurdle that I think a very few cases can overcome," he said." 4
Furthermore, the "reckless disregard" standard, which represents a
kind of "substituted judgment for the reasonableness of the journalist's
behavior," is removed from the alternative provision permitting punitive
damages, Dean Bezanson explained."' "So punitive damages will not be
subject to award in cases in which the jury, in effect, conclude[s] there
was gross negligence."' 16
Others are not convinced. Bob Hawley, an advisor to the Uniform
Defamation Act Drafting Committee from the Media Conference Group
of the ABA, said he is "deeply troubled" by the possible inclusion of
109. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
110. The Act currently contains two alternative provisions, one allowing punitive damages,
the other prohibiting them. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 10. The issue is impor-
tant to the media because 57% of all jury awards against media defendants from 1980-89
included punitive damages, with the average punitive award at more than $1.5 million. LDRC
RECAP AND UPDATE, supra note 13, at 3, 9. The average punitive damage award by juries
rose to $8.2 million in the 1990-91 period, however, Id. at 5, 9.
11. Telephone Interview with Bob Hawley, Associate General Counsel for The Hearst
Corporation and Advisor to the Uniform Defamation Act Drafting Committee from the Me-
dia Conference Group of the American Bar Association (Apr. 1, 1992). See also UNIF. DEFA-
MATION ACT, supra note 4, § 10 cmt.
112. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
113. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 10 [Alternative B]. The comment to § 10
describes ill will as an "intent to harm." Id. § 10 cmt. Dean Bezanson further explains this as
meaning that "the reason for publication was specifically to spite the plaintiff because of some
personal animus." Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
114. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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punitive damages in the Act. The proposal is especially troubling when
many compensatory awards already include "some measure of punish-
ment for speech," he said. 117 Even Dean Perlman, Chair of the Uniform
Defamation Act Drafting Committee, in arguing before the full Confer-
ence of Commissioners for the elimination of punitive damages from the
Act, said, "I think one need not fear that egregious behavior of a defama-
tory nature in the absence of punitive damages will go unpunished. Be-
cause this is a peculiar area in which the nature of compensatory
damages is so vaporous and unstructured, juries in particularly egregious
cases have a significant range to provide compensation." ' s
C. Retractions-An Area of Common Ground?
Retractions are an area of libel law that is "ripe for reform," accord-
ing to a number of media analysts.' ' In addition to the many divergent
provisions among current retraction statutes, some are clearly obsolete
under the New York Times and Gertz criteria. 20 The general provisions
of the Uniform Defamation Act's retraction provisions, however, com-
pare favorably to the most speech-protective features of a number of re-
traction statutes currently on the books.' 2 ' There are, however,
disagreements over the Act's specifics.
The Act requires a retraction to be "timely and sufficient."' 22 A
retraction is considered timely if it is published within thirty days of the
receipt of a request. A retraction is considered sufficient if it "is pub-
lished in a manner and medium reasonably calculated to reach substan-
tially the same audience as the publication complained of" and corrects
the challenged statement, or disclaims any intent to have communicated
an implied meaning.' 23 If the retraction is published in another medium
117. Hawley Interview, supra note 111.
118. Commissioner Harvey Perman, Defamation Act: Transcript of Proceedings in Com-
mittee of the Whole, 1991 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, 10th Sess., 212 (Aug. 7, 1991).
119. Baron Interview, supra note 72; Kaufman Interview, supra note 74.
120. See SANFORD, supra note 31, § 12.3.
121. See id. § 12.3.2 to .3.4.
122. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 15.
123. Id. The provisions of § 15(b)(2)(iii), which permit a publisher to retract a statement
attributed to another person by "disclaim[ing] any intent to assert or to have asserted the truth
of the statement," drew sharp criticism from several participants at the drafting committee's
October 1992 public hearing on the Act. One publisher of weekly newspapers in Tennessee
stated, "We would be laughed out of town if we suddenly announced we never intended our
readers to take a story as true." Sam D. Kennedy, Publisher of the Parsons News Leader,
Lawrence County Advocate and Waverly News Democrat, Testimony before the Uniform Defa-
mation Act Drafting Committee, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 9, 1992).
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to meet the thirty-day requirement, it must also be published in the next
issue or edition, if any, of the original publication.124
A timely and sufficient retraction under the Act will completely bar
an action for vindication.12 The defendant in an action for damages
may make a termination offer in which he agrees to publish a retraction
and pay the plaintiff's litigation expenses, including attorney fees. A
plaintiff who does not accept the offer is limited to pecuniary damages
and may not recover his litigation expenses.126 The defendant in a dam-
ages action may further limit damages by publishing a sufficient retrac-
tion either unilaterally or within thirty days after the receipt of a request,
which will limit the plaintiff to recovery "for pecuniary loss caused
before the date of the retraction."' 127
A request for a retraction is generally required as a precondition to
suit.12' To be adequate, a request must be in writing and "identify with
particularity the publication and the specific statements alleged to be
false and defamatory."' 129 However, service of a complaint, which has
the same specificity requirements as a request for a retraction, 30 will in
all cases constitute an adequate request.1 31
The timeliness and sufficiency requirements for retractions concern
critics of the Act. "The retraction section presents genuine difficulties
for anyone who's involved in publishing at greater intervals than a week
or two," said Bob Hawley, Associate General Counsel for The Hearst
Corporation. 3 2 "They are going to have a real hard time meeting the
thirty-day requirement." Mr. Hawley questioned how a film maker or
the publisher of a book would retract. Even with a monthly publication,
lead times for printing would make it difficult to meet the thirty-day
deadline.'33
The drafting committee concedes that the timeliness and sufficiency
requirements could be problematic for narrowly focused, infrequent, or
one-time publications.' 34 In such cases, "the [Act's] focus on reasonable
124. UNIF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 15.
125. l § 14.
126. Id. § 12.
127. Id § 14 and cmt.
128. Id. § 13 cmt.
129. Id. § 13(a)(2).
130. See id. § 4.
131. Id. § 13(b). The comment to Section 13 explains that this provision was included to
"avoid the preclusive effect of an inadequate earlier request or a failure to seek a retraction for
any other reason."
132. Hawley Interview, supra note 111.
133. Id.
134. UNIF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 15 cmt.
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efforts to reach the same audience will be important."' 5 The drafting
committee offers the following example as guidance:
For a book currently being sold, with no next edition in sight, reason-
able efforts to retract might involve several measures. The publisher
could make necessary corrections in any future editions; notify persons
who have purchased the book, if that information is available, or in-
stead attempt through a notice at bookstores or a press release to reach
this group; and provide through an insert or other warning notice to
those persons who will, in the future, buy the current edition. The
latter step assumes, of course, that future reputational harm can be
avoided by such an insert rather than by recalling and correcting books
that are on the shelf but unsold. 136
Even with such guidance, "you will not know what is sufficient until
there's a body of law built up," said Mr. Hawley. 137 "There's going to be
a whole sidebar of litigation that concerns retractions," he predicted,
"and those of us who practice law in this area aren't going to know what
that means for ten years."' 138 Furthermore, "if a judge rules [your effort]
is not sufficient, you've lost your timeliness, because it's now advanced
well beyond thirty days."' 139
Another problem is the practical difficulty of limiting damages to
pecuniary loss caused before the date of retraction. The drafters note
that while the Act "attempts to cut off" damages caused after the retrac-
tion, it does allow for the recovery of damages caused prior to, but ex-
tending beyond, the date of the retraction." ° Considering the practical
difficulties this provision would present to a jury,' one has to question
how much added protection it affords a defendant.
Yet another problem is the Act's requirement that when a retraction
concerns a statement attributed to another person, it must identify that
person in order to be considered sufficient, even if the original publication
did not do so.' 42 Such a requirement directly conflicts with the shield
laws adopted in about half the states. Some of these laws confer upon
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Hawley Interview, supra note 111.
138. Id.
139. Id. A retraction will be judged sufficient, however, if a plaintiff has so stated in writ-
ing. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 15(c).
140. Id. § 14 cmt.
141. The illustration provided by the drafting committee highlights these difficulties:
[I]f a physician is defamed and a retraction thereafter made, the physician should be
able to recover damages for economic loss stemming from the loss of patients prior to
the date of the retraction, even though that loss may continue for some period after
the retraction. On the other hand, economic losses resulting from patients who
changed doctors after the date of a retraction should not be recoverable, even though
their decision was based upon the original defamation.
Id.
142. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 15(b)(2)(iii) and cmt.
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members of the news media an absolute immunity against the forced dis-
closure of a confidential source in any legal proceeding,143 while others
confer a qualified immunity against disclosure, which can be overcome
by a showing of need for the information.144
Still other states have adopted by court decision a qualified privilege
against disclosure based upon Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Branzburg v. Hayes. 4' Lower courts have generally interpreted
Branzburg as requiring a qualified privilege against the disclosure of
sources by members of the news media. 46 Therefore, the Act's provision
that a retraction must reveal the source of a challenged statement in or-
der to be considered sufficient raises constitutional questions.
Additionally, the disclosure requirement offers an opportunity for
plaintiffs to punish the press when confidential sources are used. Defend-
ants caught in this situation could be forced into a vindication action
because they cannot in good faith retract the statement, and they would
have a difficult time prevailing in court. With the potential penalty of
paying all litigation expenses and publication expenses of the court's find-
ings, such a conflict could have a chilling effect on speech.
Dean Perlman explained that the provision was added for situations
in which the press would want to opt out of a vindication action because
it has no interest in defending the truth or falsity of the statement.
Rather, the important fact was that the statement was made about the
plaintiff. In order to allow the press to opt out of a vindication action in
such situations, the drafting committee decided that plaintiffs at least
should be informed "who they ought to go after." '147
"There might or might not be a conflict [with current shield laws],
depending upon whether giving somebody a choice and then essentially
depriving them of [that] choice is a punishment," said Dean Perlman. 148
"There are always costs associated with asserting privileges and you
don't have to retract. You can play it all the way to the hilt, and that's
just one of the choices that the press might have to make." '49
143. Pennsylvania is among those states that confer an absolute privilege against disclo-
sure. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1982).
144. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 12.0612][b].
145. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Lower court interpretations of Branzburg have generally re-
garded Justice Powell's vote as controlling in the 5-4 decision and have adopted his qualified
privilege standard. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 12.06[2][a][ii].
146. See SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 12.06[2][a][ii] n. 145 (note 145 contains a list of decisions
following this position).
147. Telephone Interview with Harvey S. Perlman, Chair of the Uniform Defamation Act





With but a few changes, the Uniform Defamation Act seeks to cod-
ify presently recognized privileges to publish defamatory speech.'
50
These privileges protect defendants from otherwise actionable defama-
tion claims. 5 ' Like the later constitutional protections, these common
law privileges "grew out of a recognition that in certain circumstances
the social interest in the free flow of information is so important that
allowance for mistakes must be made, even at the expense of leaving the
victims of defamatory speech remediless."' 1
52
Under the Act, absolute privileges can be raised in order to totally
foreclose both damage and vindication actions. 5 3 Conditional privileges,
however, cannot bar an action for vindication under the Act, and are
subject to defeasance in an action for damages if the plaintiff proves
abuse of the privilege by clear and convincing evidence.' 54
1. Absolute Privileges
Of the Act's absolute privileges to be discussed here, 55 the first con-
cerns statements made by participants "in and pertaining to" judicial
proceedings, legislative proceedings, or any quasi-judicial or quasi-legis-
lative executive or administrative proceeding.' 5 6 The common law ra-
tionale behind this privilege is to encourage participants in government
and its proceedings to speak openly without fear of defamation
liability. 1
57
If, regarding judicial proceedings, the intent of the drafting commit-
tee was to include within the privilege extrajudicial statements to other
participants in the proceeding, as well as to potential participants in an-
ticipation of legal action, the Act would be in line with current law. "8
The Act's treatment of legislative speech, limiting the absolute privilege
to statements uttered during official proceedings, is consistent with cur-
rent law, although the Act leaves open to interpretation the particular
individuals to whom the protection extends. 1" 9 Moreover, the drafting
150. See UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 16 cmt., § 17 cmt.
151. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 8.011].
152. Id.
153. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 16 and cmt.
154. Id. § 3 and cmt., § 17 and cmt.
155. Statements communicated between husband and wife as well as statements published
with the consent of the person harmed are also listed as absolutely privileged. Id. § 16(3), (4).
156. Id. § 16(1).
157. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 8.01[2].
158. See SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.4.2.
159. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 16 cmt. See also SANFORD, supra note 31,
§ 10.4.4 (some states extend the privilege to the proceedings of city councils and other
subordinate legislative bodies).
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committee specifically states that its intention is not to foreclose addi-
tional absolute privileges rooted in other statutory or constitutional pro-
visions, 1"° such as the broad immunity for defamatory speech by federal
executive and administrative officers under Barr v. Matteo.16 1
The second absolute privilege of special interest to the press is re-
ferred to in the common law as the fair report privilege.1 62 The Act's
version of the fair report privilege is more narrow than the common law.
The Act bars actions regarding statements that constitute "a fair and
accurate report of an official action or proceeding of a governmental
body, including an order or opinion of a court, or of a meeting of a gov-
ernmental body which is open to the public."'' 63 The common law in-
cludes in its coverage any meeting open to the public on a matter of
public concern, whether or not associated with a governmental body.l6M
The third absolute privilege of special interest concerns statements
"required by law to be published."' 16 The comment to Section 16 in the
Act offers no guidance as to what statements would be covered under
this provision. The common law, however, extends protection under the
fair report privilege to the fair and accurate publication by third persons
of arrest reports, reports filed by government officers and agencies, and
other governmental documents. 166 This provision of the Uniform Defa-
mation Act would be in line with the current law if it is meant to extend
an absolute privilege to such documents. 167
Under the common law, the fair report privilege is a conditional
privilege. 168 Because the privilege is only lost by a showing that the re-
port was substantially inaccurate or unfair, 169 however, and is not de-
feated by a showing of malice or actual malice, 7 ' it is in reality more
akin to an absolute privilege. 7' Therefore, the primary practical effect of
the Act's denomination of the fair report privilege as an absolute privi-
lege would be to bar statements subject to the privilege from vindication
actions.
160. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 16 cmt.
161. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
162. While the fair report privilege is primarily a rule of state common law, variations of
the privilege have been codified in some states. SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.2.
163. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 16(2).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 and cmt. i (1977).
165. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 16(5).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmts. d, h (1977); SANFORD, supra note
31, § 10.2.3.
167. See SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.2.3.
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. a (1977).
169. Id. § 611 cmts. a, f.
170. Id. § 611 cmt. b.
171. SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.3.3.
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The fair report privilege is important to the press because it offers
even broader protection than New York Times v. Sullivan 172 and the
cases following it. The privilege protects fair and accurate reports even
when the publisher knows the reported statement is false. Further, the
privilege is not limited to cases involving public officials or public figures
as plaintiffs. 173 Indeed, the Restatement asserts that the fair report privi-
lege is constitutionally required when libel litigation concerns an official
governmental document, action, or proceeding.' 74
2. Conditional Privileges
The conditional privileges listed in Section 17 of the Act reflect the
conditional privileges available at common law. 17' The Act also codifies
the constitutional fault standards as conditional privileges in Section 18.
Whereas absolute privileges "attach to certain speakers or forums," con-
ditional privileges are situational and are "governed by the interrelation-
ships between the speaker, the listener, the victim, and the content of the
speech."' 176 Because the speech at stake under the conditional privileges
is considered worthy of enhanced, but not absolute, protection, the privi-
leges may be lost through abuse. 177
Under the Act, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to establish a privilege,
while the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence abuse of a privilege. 77 The Act adopts the common law rule
for the Section 17 conditional privileges-i.e., that they may be lost by
excessive publication, which is defined as unreasonable publication "to
persons other than those to whom publication was necessary to serve the
interests giving rise to the privilege."'' 79
The common law also enabled a conditional privilege to be defeated
by a showing of negligence or malice.'8 ° The Act, however, adopts the
Restatement position, requiring proof of actual malice in all cases in
172. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
173. SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.2.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. b (1977) ("If the report of a public
official proceeding is accurate or a fair abridgment, an action cannot constitutionally be main-
tained, either for defamation or for invasion of the right of privacy."). See also SANFORD,
supra note 31, § 10.2.2.
175. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 17 cmt. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 594-98A (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 115 (5th ed. 1984).
176. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 8.01[2].
177. Id.
178. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 3(2)(i), (4).
179. Id. § 17(b)(1). See also SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 8.07[2].
180. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 8.07[2].
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which fault is alleged,' whether the privilege has a common law or con-
stitutional basis.18 2
In response to critics of the Act's narrow fair report privilege, 8 3
Dean Bezanson maintained, "Anything that is reported from a public
meeting that might not qualify under the absolute privileges of Section
16, presuming it pertains to a matter of public interest, will be subject to
[a conditional] privilege."' 8 4 Given the example of a mall developer who
is defamed at a non-governmental public meeting protesting a proposed
construction project, Dean Bezanson said this could be privileged as
speech to protect the publisher's interests or to protect a common inter-
est between the publisher and recipient.'8 5
Dean Bezanson added that the requirement of showing actual mal-
ice to defeat a conditional privilege is more protective than current law in
most jurisdictions, which would allow the privilege to be lost upon a
showing of negligence if the plaintiff is a private figure.'8 6 This assertion
of greater protection can be challenged, however, on the basis that the
fair report privilege does not consider fault at all. The only question
under the fair report privilege is whether the report is fair and
accurate. 1
87
The assertion of greater protection also fails to take into account
that the press may act as a surrogate for interested members of the public
who cannot attend an open meeting on a matter of public concern.'
Whether the press would obtain whatever protection the speaker pos-
sesses in a nongovernmental meeting is an open question.' 8 9 In any case,
the lack of a fair report privilege in these situations would probably make
an action for damages less amenable to summary judgment.190
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977).
182. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 17(b)(2) and cmt., § 18(2) and cmt.
183. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
184. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
185. Id. See UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 17(a)(l), (a)(3).
186. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3; SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 8.07[3][a]-[b].
187. See SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.3.
188. See generally id § 10.2.1 (the fair report privilege operates on the rationale that the
press merely acts as a substitute for members of the public not in attendance at a public
proceeding).
189. In any case, it would appear that the privilege could be lost through "excessive publi-
cation" by the press. See UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 17(b)(1).
190. Under the fair report privilege, the defendant would only need to prove that the report
was a substantially accurate and fair rendition of what transpired at the public meeting,
thereby eliminating all the discovery that could be required on the issue of fault under the Act.
See SANFORD, supra note 31, § 10.3.
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E. Republication-Maintaining the Archaic Rules
While the Uniform Defamation Act's rules on liability for the re-
publication of a defamatory statement are in some ways reflective of cur-
rent law, in others they are a step backward from the law in some
jurisdictions.
The Act adopts the Restatement position that a person who repub-
lishes a statement is subject to liability just as if he or she were the origi-
nal publisher.1 I" The evolution of the rule "is probably attributable to
the basic instinct in human nature that finds gossipmongers repul-
sive."192 The problem, however, is that the rule can "hamstring the press
in its coverage of newsworthy events and controversies."'193 Professor
Smolla provides the following example in his treatise on defamation law:
Imagine that two days before an election a local political candi-
date charges an opponent with having taken a bribe. Imagine that the
local newspaper editor is absolutely certain that the charge is a lie-the
paper has thoroughly investigated the whole alleged incident and
found that it was fabricated. Under the common law republication
rules the paper will be deemed to have "adopted" the defamatory false-
hood if it publishes the candidate's charge, even if the paper also prints
its counterevidence and the other candidate's denials. Furthermore,
because the newspaper does not believe in the truth of the charge, it is
technically publishing with actual malice-knowledge of falsity.
' The editor would of course maintain that the charge is news-
worthy, for the very making of such a false charge signifies the dishon-
esty of the candidate who made it .... For better or for worse, most
editors in the United States would probably run the story, presenting
both the defamatory statements and the counterevidence and denials.
The common law position would subject the newspapers managed by
these editors to liability for defamation.' 
94
Due to the inadequacy of the common law republication rules, the
judicial doctrine of "neutral reportage" has slowly been gaining accept-
ance19 5 since it was first articulated in Edwards v. National Audubon So-
ciety.' 96 The neutral reportage privilege protects the press when it
"accurately and disinterestedly" reports newsworthy charges of a serious
nature leveled against a public official or public figure involved in some
191. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 19 and cmt.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 578, 581 (1977). The rule only applies to the issue of publication. The republisher
still retains the constitutional fault protections. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 4.13[l][c].
192. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 4.13 n.281.
193. Id. § 4.14[1].
194. Id.
195. Id. § 4.14[4]. Professor Smolla notes, however, that some jurisdictions have rejected
the doctrine as going beyond the constitutional privileges of New York Times and Gertz, and
other courts have expressed skepticism about the doctrine's basis. Id. See generally Scott E.
Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a Statutory Privilege, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 417 (1992).
196. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. New York Times Co., 434
U.S. 1002 (1977).
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controversy, when the charges are made by another public official or
public figure or a prominent organization.197 Professor Smolla has com-
mented that the privilege "contributes significantly to the free flow of
information concerning public controversies," yet is not "gratuitously
generous to the media" because of the clearly defined parameters given
the doctrine by courts. 198
An early version of the Uniform Defamation Act contained a nar-
row neutral reportage privilege, protecting the republisher when the
reputational harm from the statement was not foreseeable and the source
of the information was credible and was divulged.199 This explicit neu-
tral reportage privilege was deleted from the Act "not because nobody
liked it, but because it would be completely unnecessary," said Dean
Bezanson.200 At the drafting committee's meetings, the libel defense law-
yers who were acting as liaisons to the committee raised a number of
situations which they said illustrated the need for a neutral reportage
privilege, Dean Bezanson related. All of the situations they raised, how-
ever, would be protected under the conditional privileges of Sections 17
and 18, which require a showing of actual malice, he claimed.2"'
"I don't think [the neutral reportage privilege] is in there explicitly,
and I don't think it's in there as broadly [as some] would want it in
there," Dean Perlman commented.2 "2 "The fact is that the majority of
the [drafting] committee didn't want it in there as broadly as the press
wanted it."2 "3
The even narrower wire service privilege also was not included in
the Act. This privilege shields newspapers and broadcasters from liabil-
ity for republications originating with a news-gathering agency.z " The
wire service defense is generally available when the following four ele-
ments are established:
(1) The defendant received a wire release from a reputable news gath-
ering agency; (2) the defendant did not actually know the story was
false; (3) nothing on the face of the story itself reasonably would have
alerted the defendant that the story may be incorrect; and (4) the de-
fendant reprinted the wire release without substantial change.20 5
The drafting committee stated that a specific wire service privilege
was not included in the Act because "constitutional privileges have made
197. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 4.14[3].
198. Id. § 4.14[4].
199. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT § 7-101 (Draft, July 13-20, 1990).
200. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
201. Id.
202. Perlman Interview, supra note 147.
203. Id.
204. SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 4.13[l][d].
205. Id.
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it unnecessary."2 °" The Libel Defense Resource Center points out, how-
ever, that if the drafting committee intended for a wire service privilege
to be covered under the Act, an express provision seems appropriate in
light of "the Supreme Court's recent disinclination to read additional
privileges into the constitutional rule of actual malice."2 °7
Although Dean Bezanson maintained that including "redundant"
provisions in the Act would only "breed confusion,"2'08 an argument can
be made that not including such a provision would in fact be confusing.
The drafting committee describes the wire service privilege as "the pro-
tection of a person who provides a means of publication for a privileged
publisher."20 9 Does this mean that the drafting committee only intends
to give the republisher in a wire service privilege scenario the level of
protection held by the original publisher? If so, it would seem to place a
large burden on the republisher to ascertain whether the original pub-
lisher is covered under one of the Act's privileges before publishing.
On the other side of the coin, the Act's provisions regarding liability
of the original publisher are in line with the common law's general rule
that the original publisher is liable if the republication was "reasonably
foreseeable."21 0 However, the Act does provide several safe harbors for
the original publisher, e.g., if the original publisher made a sufficient re-
traction prior to the republication, or if the original publisher did not
publish with actual malice and requested the republisher, before the re-
publication, not to publish.211 These exceptions would not appear to pro-
vide much protection for the original publisher in a breaking news
situation, however, in an age when news reports are broadcast almost
instantaneously over television and radio or appear in the next edition of
a newspaper within a matter of hours.
A final problem in the republication area appears to be the Act's
adoption of the current minority position on the limitation of libel ac-
tions, i.e., a rule based on the plaintiff's discovery of the publication.212
Under the Act, a claim may be brought against a publisher within five
years of a publication or, in the case of a republication, within ten years
206. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 17 cmt.
207. Follow-Up Report, supra note 27, at 8 (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991), and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707
(1990)).
208. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
209. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 17 cmt. Furthermore, the wire service priv-
ilege does not come under the Act's Section 21 protections for information retrieval services
such as libraries and electronic databases. See id. § 21.
210. Id. § 20; SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 4.13[2].
211. UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, § 20.
212. SANFORD, supra note 31, § 13.2.4 ("The time period for statute of limitations pur-
poses generally begins running on the day following the date of publication.").
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of the original publication.213 Within these limitation periods, however,
"a claim is barred one year after the plaintiff knew or should have known
of the publication or republication. 214
The limitations period in most situations has been clarified by the
drafting committee's recent explanation that "a discovery provision
should have no significant effect in most [media] cases, as it should be
interpreted as justifying the conclusion that the plaintiff 'should have
known' of the story at the time of its publication."21 Similarly, at least
one state that has adopted the discovery rule for some situations does not
apply it in defamation actions involving the media.216
Cases involving republications are more complex. The drafting com-
mittee does not explain whether the period during which the plaintiff
'should have known' of the publication, and hence during which the orig-
inal publisher can be held liable, begins running at the time of the origi-
nal publication or upon republication.21' If the latter, such a rule could
have an adverse impact on all media, because reporters' notes and tapes
become harder to locate over time. The effects of such a rule would be
especially egregious for small radio and television stations, where retain-
ing broadcast tapes within current shorter limitations periods2"' is al-
ready a problem.219 In addition, many television stations and networks
have cooperative agreements, through which they freely share mate-
rial. 220  A limitations period that begins running upon republication
could open many of these outlets to long periods of liability.
III
The Prognosis for Change
A. General Reactions to the Act
Overall media reactions to the Act take the form of three general
criticisms: that the Act is based upon a faulty premise, that the provi-
213. UNIF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 25(a).
214. Id. § 25(b).
215. Id. § 25 cmt. This comment was first included in the December 6, 1991, draft.
216. See Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. 1976) (adopting the discovery rule for
defamatory credit reports, but not where a defamation is made a matter of public knowledge
through print or broadcast media).
217. See UNIP. DEFAMATION AT, supra note 4, § 25 and cmt.
218. Nearly half the states have a one-year limitations period, and only seven states have
limitations periods exceeding two years, with four years being the longest. Report of the Libel
Defense Resource Center on the [Uniform] Defamation Act, at 77 (June 25, 1990) [hereinafter
Report on the [Uniform] Defamation Act].
219. Telephone Interview with Steve Bookshester, Associate General Counsel for the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters (Mar. 23, 1992).
220. Id.
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sions of the Act are weighted toward plaintiffs, and that even an accepta-
ble Act could not be kept intact in state legislatures.
1. The Premise
As discussed in the Introduction, much of the empirical evidence
underlying the action for vindication is based upon the findings of the
Iowa Libel Research Project. This study found that many libel plaintiffs
were more interested in vindication of their names than in recovering
monetary damages.221 "I think if you asked a libel plaintiff if he is in it
for the money, the natural instinct of any person under those circum-
stances is to deny that and to say... 'All I want is for my reputation to
be vindicated,'" commented Bob Hawley. 222
Others have criticized the Iowa Project for basing its conclusions
upon retrospective interviews, when most plaintiffs had already lost their
suits. After the fact, "[i]t was thus easy for the plaintiffs to be reflective,
revisionist and more reasonable in their attitudes," commented the
LDRC.223
While acknowledging these weaknesses, Dean Bezanson said, "We
have never attempted to put an exact percentage on the number of plain-
tiffs, or even the specific typology of plaintiffs, who seek vindication as
opposed to monetary damages. We've rather tried to be careful to say
that what we know indicates.., many.., plaintiffs are principally inter-
ested in vindicating their reputations. '2 24
Vindicatory motivations can quickly be converted to a lawsuit for
monetary damages based upon the media defendant's response to the of-
fending statement and the plaintiff's need to receive some sort of financial
return once a libel suit is undertaken, Dean Bezanson explained. The
pattern of plaintiff responses concerning their initial motivations and
how those motivations changed over time gave the study directors "even
more confiden[ce] in the fundamental reliability of what we were told,"
said Dean Bezanson.225
The Iowa Project recently completed a second study to determine
"when and under what circumstances the parties in media libel suits
would agree to drop court action and to divert disputes to mediation
and/or arbitration. ' 226 The Libel Dispute Resolution Program made
contact with attorneys in 128 cases at the pretrial stages of litigation from
221. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
222. Hawley Interview, supra note 111.
223. Report on the [Uniform] Defamation Act, supra note 218, at 10.
224. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
225. Id.
226. IOWA LIBEL RESEARCH PROJECT, LIBEL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM I (Nov.
10, 1991) (press release).
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mid-1987 through the end of 1990.227 In just fifteen of these disputes
were both parties interested in using the program, with both parties in
nine cases expressing serious interest. In only five of the cases did both
parties agree to submit their disputes to the program.228
Furthermore, the study found that defendants had a greater interest
than plaintiffs in this alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") program,
by a margin of thirty-eight percent to twenty-six percent. The program
directors explained that since plaintiffs would be required to dismiss their
suits in order to participate in the program, they were more often pressed
to state whether they had any interest, which might account for the
difference.229
The attorneys in these cases, many of whom had a financial stake in
the outcome230 and were accustomed to settling disputes through litiga-
tion, were not only "instrumental in the decision whether to accept or
reject the program," but, "in some instances, had not informed clients of
the availability of the option. ' 231  The program directors also noted how
the parties' interests in a nondamage remedy shifted as one party gained
some tactical advantage over the other.23 2
Dean Bezanson said that the most recent study confirms how impor-
tant it is to reach parties early on, before litigation progresses very far,
for nondamage remedies to be effective.2 3 3 Indeed, the program directors
suggest that "editors and news directors are in a key position to propose
ADR when an impasse is reached with complainants," before attorneys
become involved in the dispute.234
Furthermore, the program directors "saw the same ... pattern of
responses before trial and at the early stages of litigation as we did retro-
spectively in the earlier study," Dean Bezanson said. 235 "So I think if
anything, the second study confirms the earlier findings about plaintiff
motivations.
236
Others interpret the results of the Iowa Project's Libel Dispute Res-
olution Program differently. "I think the results of the Iowa study are
227. Id at 2. Eighty percent of these contacts were initiated by the program staff. See id.
228. Id at 3. A number of the cases in which both parties expressed interest were subse-
quently settled prior to any work with the program, with several attorneys in these cases say-
ing that contact between the parties initiated through the program facilitated settlement. Id.
229. Id. at 4.
230. Seventy-three percent of plaintiffs' attorneys in the original Iowa Libel Research Pro-
ject were retained on a contingency fee basis. BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 69.
231. IOWA LIBEL RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 226, at 5.
232. Id. at 4.
233. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
234. IOWA LIBEL RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 226, at 5.
235. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
236. Id.
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... at least supportive of our skepticism of the plaintiff's interest in this
sort of thing," said Henry Kaufman, General Counsel for the Libel De-
fense Resource Center.237
"I don't think vindication is what plaintiffs are generally looking
for. They want to punish publishers. They want money," said Sandy
Baron. 3 In her experience, "sometimes the guy you retract sues
anyway., 23
9
Although merely anecdotal, a recent case seems to confirm Ms.
Baron's experiences. Ertel v. The Patriot News Co. 240 has its roots in a
newspaper article that questioned the prosecution's conduct in a notori-
ous murder case. 241' The article was based on an investigation and report
by a prominent defense attorney hired by the convicted man's family, in
which the attorney concluded that the family's claim of "manipulation
and/or tampering of evidence has significant merit.
24 2
The article, while noting that Mr. Ertel prosecuted the case as a
former district attorney, did not accuse him of any personal misconduct.
Furthermore, the article noted that every appeal of the conviction over
eleven years had been unsuccessful.
Not only did the newspaper later retract "any and all implications
that Allen Ertel ... acted improperly when he prosecuted Kim Lee Hub-
bard," but it also provided Ertel reply space. 243 Furthermore, the news-
paper ran both the retraction and reply in the exact same location where
the original article was published. 2 "4 Nevertheless, Mr. Ertel sued. The
trial court granted the newspaper's summary judgment motion.245 On
appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the lower court and
remanded the case for trial.246
237. Kaufman Interview, supra note 74.
238. Baron Interview, supra note 72.
239. Id. Indeed, in the original Iowa Project study, the second most-frequently cited rea-
son why plaintiffs sued was to punish the press. See supra note 19.
240. No. 1908 Philadelphia 1991 (Pa. Super. Ct., Nov. 17, 1992)(mem.), reargument de-
nied, Jan. 29, 1993.
241. Dick Sarge, Lawyer Questions Man's 1974 Murder Conviction, SUNDAY PATRIOT-
NEWS, June 30, 1985, at BI.
242. Id.
243. See Patriot-News Company Apologizes to Allen Ertel, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS, July 7,
1985, at BI.
244. Id.
245. Ertel v. The Patriot News Co., No. 2145 Civ. (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. County, May 10,
1991).
246. Ertel v. The Patriot News Co., No. 1908 Philadelphia 1991 (Pa. Super. Ct., Nov. 17,
1992)(mem.), reargument denied, Jan. 29, 1993. Significantly, the court held that the newspa-
per's retraction provided evidence of actual malice. Id., slip op. at 20-21.
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2. Act Favors Plaintiffs
Even if the drafting committee were to convince the press that the
action for vindication is a sound idea, the committee would still be faced
with the overwhelming perception that the Act is weighted toward plain-
tiffs. "The Act basically [adopts] ...either a middle of the road or
somewhat conservative doctrine," said Rodney Smolla, the ABA's advi-
sor to the drafting committee.247
"[I]t might fairly be said that the Drafting Committee's approach
too often errs, if not at every possible juncture, in favor of the libel plain-
tiff," the LDRC similarly commented about an early draft of the Act.248
Indeed, the Act often adopts the minimum protections required
under the Constitution. In addition to the provisions previously dis-
cussed, the Act requires that the plaintiff prove falsity by a preponder-
ance of the evidence,249 instead of by clear and convincing evidence, as
many courts have held.250 Furthermore, the Act follows Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.2 1 by recognizing no special opinion privilege.
252
However, the drafting committee declined to include an explicit fair
comment privilege,253 which some commentators contend could take on
renewed vitality following Milkovich.25 4
In fairness to the drafting committee, thoughtful reasoning stands
behind each decision.2 55 On balance, however, it does seem that most of
247. Smolla Interview, supra note 81.
248. Report on the [Uniform) Defamation Act, supra note 218, at 33.
249. In Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), the Court declined to
consider the standard of proof a libel plaintiff must meet in order to establish a challenged
statement's falsity. Id. at 779 n.4.
250. See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241, 248 (D.D.C. 1987); Sharon v. Time
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Pape v. Time Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1087, 1088
(N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, 419 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 279 (1971);
Whitmore v. Kansas City Star, 499 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
The most recent working version of the Act, however, would require that falsity be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. See UNIF. DEFAMATION ACT § 2-106 (Tent. Draft,
Oct. 21, 1992 (1/05/93 Revision)).
251. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
252. See UNIF. DEFAMATION AT, supra note 4, § 2 cmt.
253. See id. § 17 cmt. Generally, the fair comment privilege "attaches to comments made
on matters of public interest, based upon facts presented as part of the communication or else
publicly available, and made honestly and without malice." SANFORD, supra note 31, § 5.2.
254. Courts could choose "to give opinions broader common law 'breathing space' than is
strictly necessary under the first amendment through more expansive interpretations of the
common law fair comment doctrine." SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 6.02[4][a]. For decisions in
which courts have done just that see Cassidy v. Merin, 582 A.2d 1039, 1046-48 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990); Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1281-82 (N.Y.), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
255. Dean Bezanson contends, for instance, that requiring proof of falsity by clear and
convincing evidence would be both unfair and "unwise as a matter of policy because plaintiffs
1992]
these decisions are reached in favor of plaintiffs. "Anytime in which
you're trying to strike a compromise between two basic interests, it's just
an individual perception about whether the tradeoff is an appropriate
one," said Dean Perlman.256 "There are pieces of the puzzle that are in
the interest of both sides of the controversy, and whether the press...
believes they're getting enough is up to them. I think they're getting
plenty. "257
3. Change in State Legislatures
Steve Bookshester of the National Association of Broadcasters con-
tends that "there's no such thing as a uniform Uniform Act." He sub-
scribes to "the let loose the dogs of war theory," meaning that "once you
set this thing [the Uniform Defamation Act] loose in the legislative pro-
cess, you just can't control it."'25
Debating the merits of the Uniform Defamation Act in fifty different
state legislatures is "a situation we never want to have to face," said
Henry Kaufman.259
These fears are based on the lack of any guarantee that a reform
proposal "would stay 'as written' when it reaches the legislative arena,"
notes one commentator.2 1 "Upsetting the delicate tradeoffs underlying
a reform act might well create a law with significant chilling effects on
press freedom. '261
Such changes would not only defeat the commissioners' own goal of
uniformity, but also exacerbate the problems of forum shopping262 and
the potential explosion of "sidebar litigation" over the meaning of the
Act's provisions, which some critics predict will follow its enactment. 263
Assuming that some balancing of interests could be agreed upon by the
parties, the risk of state legislatures' upsetting that balance creates the
in most libel suits are required to prove a negative," e.g., that they are "not a crook." Further-
more, he said, the defendant's behavior should not be an issue in a vindication action, because
fault is not relevant. Therefore, the defendant's actions should not sway the jury in reaching
its determination regarding truth or falsity. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
256. Perlman Interview, supra note 147.
257. Id.
258. Bookshester Interview, supra note 219.
259. Kaufman Interview, supra note 74.
260. Dienes, supra note 1, at 15.
261. Id. Although the author was here discussing the Annenberg Libel Reform Act, his
point is equally applicable to the Uniform Defamation Act.
262. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 546 n.225 and accompanying text. See also Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 12.03[7].
263. Hawley Interview, supra note 111.
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potential for "constitutional offenses that require years of effort to undo
and that inhibit fundamental freedoms until undone." 264
B. The Chances for Passage
Not surprisingly, media support for the Act is practically non-exis-
tent. There was some talk of one or two electronic publishers publicly
endorsing an earlier draft of the Act that excluded punitive damages, but
that support evaporated when the punitive damages alternative was
reinstated.265
Even Dean Perlman, Chair of the Drafting Committee, urged the
full Conference of Commissioners to eliminate punitive damages in order
to preserve "some glimmer of hope that the press and other defendants
would find this [A]ct suitable.12 66  Questioned more recently on this
viewpoint, Dean Perlman replied, "I still believe that. '267
"If the Commissioners were to adopt the Act as it substantially is
now.., there's no doubt in my mind that with or without the [elimina-
tion ofi punitive damages, you can expect the organized media bar to be
eighty percent lined up against this," Professor Smolla commented. 268
"Experience tells us that it's very, very difficult to modify the legal re-
gime in any industry against that much industry opposition, particularly
when you're dealing with constitutional issues.9 269
Professor Smolla surmises that the Act would have a better chance
of garnering media support if, in addition to eliminating punitive dam-
ages, the vindication option would require the consent of both parties to
the action.270 Others agree with this assessment.271
"I wouldn't jump at that too quickly," Dean Perlman replied when
asked about the lack of any apparent media support for the Act. 272 "I
would say that most lawyers who represent national media are against it.
264. Report on the [Uniform] Defamation Act, supra note 218, at 28.
265. Milam Interview, supra note 83. Dun & Bradstreet recently stated its support for the
Act, so long as the Act's current provisions remained intact in state legislatures. Letter from
A. Buffum Lovell, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., to
Harvey S. Perlman, Chair of the Uniform Defamation Act Drafting Committee, at 1 (August
12, 1992).
266. Commissioner Harvey Perlman, Defamation Act: Transcript of Proceedings in Com-
mittee of the Whole, 1991 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, 9th Sess., 94 (Aug. 6, 1991). Dean Perlman later warned the commissioners that with-
out the ban, further drafting might become an "academic exercise." Perlman, supra note 118,
at 210.
267. Perlman Interview, supra note 147.
268. Smolla Interview, supra note 81.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Dienes, supra note 1, at 18.
272. Perlman Interview, supra note 147.
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I don't think that you can say more than that unless you've done a
broader survey. 2 73
Dean Bezanson is hoping to engage the attention and support of
editors, publishers, and reporters, "those people who are involved in the
process that is at stake here."274 As the costs of defending libel suits
continue to grow, which could soon cut into newsroom budgets, he
thinks people will realize that the First Amendment is served by reexam-
ining "the disaster that we have for libel law right now and trying to find
some better ways to deal with this problem. '2 75
Even advocates of libel law reform acknowledge the media's misgiv-
ings over such proposals. One commentator writes: "Media skepticism
of reform proposals is understandable. They are being asked to trade
risks that are generally known, sometimes controllable, and nearly al-
ways insurable, for changes whose effects are at least as unpredictable
now as the effects of New York Times and Gertz were when those cases
were decided." '276
In addition, every act adopted by the Uniform Law Commissioners
is submitted to the ABA House of Delegates for approval. The House
adopts almost every act submitted "because we work closely with the
ABA throughout the process" and "come up with a happy medium,"
said Renee Skower, Administrative Assistant for the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.2 77 The Act's chances of
passage in the House of Delegates would appear to be problematic, be-
cause one ABA advisor, Bob Hawley, has expressed serious reservations
about the Act2 78 and the ABA's primary advisor, Professor Smolla, has
declared that he is "essentially opposed to the Act. '2 79
Interestingly, the Act has not garnered support from the organized
plaintiffs' bar either. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has
not taken a stand one way or the other on the Uniform Defamation
Act.280 "It's not been a particularly hot issue here," said Madelyn Ap-
pelbaum, ATLA's Director of Public Relations. 28 1
273. Id.
274. Bezanson Interview, supra note 3.
275. Id.
276. Anderson, supra note 1, at 549.
277. Skower Interview, supra note 7.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 132, 133, 137, 138, 222, and 263.
279. Smolla Interview, supra note 81.
280. Telephone Interview with Madelyn Appelbaum, Director of Public Relations for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (April 27, 1992).
281. Id.
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Conclusions
Piecemeal change is the best answer to libel law reform.28 2 While
not as dramatic as a complete overhaul of the law, it offers a better
chance of acceptance when experimenting with new remedies, especially
in an area of the law as sensitive as libel, with its constitutional
overtones.28 3
An action for vindication would help to eliminate the very real prob-
lem faced by many plaintiffs who do not have a legal remedy by which to
vindicate their reputations. However, such a remedy should be truly op-
tional, requiring the consent of both parties. If, as the proponents of the
Uniform Defamation Act submit, many libel plaintiffs would be satisfied
with a vindication remedy, then the premise should prove itself out in
practice.
Presumably, media defendants would soon readily agree to the op-
tion if it proves to be less expensive than current fault-based litigation. If
media defendants do balk at using the vindication option merely because
of a fear of tarnishing their reputations, that news too would soon be
disseminated, and media defendants would be shamed into using the pro-
cess where appropriate.
A vindication cause of action would likely receive greater accept-
ance than current mediation and arbitration programs because it would
have the imprimatur of the state behind it. Furthermore, plaintiffs and
defendants would likely learn about an action for vindication earlier in
the process, when such options hold greater promise for settling disputes.
In addition, developing a uniform retraction statute would appear to
be an area of libel law ripe for action by the Uniform Law Commission-
ers. Ideally, such a statute would encourage potential plaintiffs to seek
timely retractions and limit them to provable economic losses when they
do not. Such a statute would also encourage media defendants to retract
by limiting plaintiffs to provable economic losses when a timely retrac-
tion is made, thus allowing plaintiffs both vindication and recovery for
282. See Dienes, supra note 1, at 18.
283. Accepting that some sections of the Act have more appeal than others, the drafting
committee has come to much the same conclusion. Following its October 1992 public hearing,
the committee set about to divide the Act into four articles-definitions, actions for damages,
actions for vindication, and retractions-which can be separately adopted. Bezanson Inter-
view, supra note 3 (Jan. 25, 1993). Apart from limitations on fee shifting and a higher stan-
dard of proof for falsity, supra notes 63, 96, and 255, its provisions remain substantively the




any actual economic losses.284 Furthermore, a plaintiff should not be
permitted to use the publication of a correction as evidence of liability.2 5
Finally, punitive damages should be outlawed. Sufficient evidence
exists that many juries already include a punitive element in their gener-
ally amorphous compensatory awards. With libel awards now reaching
into the tens of millions of dollars, and totalling $190 million in the 1990-
91 period alone,28 6 the complete elimination of punitive damages would
at least slow this substantial danger to freedom of speech.
There is therefore a place for the Uniform Law Commissioners in
the reform of libel law, albeit a much scaled back and more balanced one.
284. A retraction statute should, in this author's viewpoint, also include a neutral report-
age privilege, which would protect the press in the responsible reporting of any public contro-
versy. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. This would protect the media from
having to disclaim an intention to assert the truth of statements made by persons involved in
these controversies. See supra note 123.
285. See supra note 246.
286. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, supra note 13, at 5, 8.
[V€ol. 15:21
1992] THE UNIFORM DEFAMATION Acr
Appendix
Uniform Defamation Act
February 6, 1992, Draft
D R A F T
FOR DISCUSSION ONLY
UNIFORM DEFAMATION ACT
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
February 6, 1992, Draft
UNIFORM DEFAMATION ACT
With Prefatory Note and Comments
The ideas and conclusions herein set forth, including drafts of
proposed legislation, have not been passed upon by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. They do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Committee, Reporters or
Commissioners. Proposed statutory language, if any, may not be
used to ascertain legislative meaning of any promulgated final
law.
19921 THE UNIFORM DEFAMATION ACT
DRAFTING COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM DEFAMATION ACT
HARVEY S. PERLMAN, University of Nebraska, College of Law, Lincoln,
NE 68583, Chair
JACK DAVIES, Court of Appeals, Judicial Building, 25 Constitution
Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55155
LEWIS C. GREEN, Suite 1830, 314 North Broadway, St. Louis,
MO 63102
JOHN F. HAYES, Suite 260, 335 North Washington, Hutchinson,
KS 67504
KATHRYN L. HOVE, 2371 Highway 1, N.E., Solon, IA 52333
ELMER R. OETTINGER, 58 Oakwood Drive, Chapel Hill, NC 27514
MATTHEW S. RAE, JR., 34th Floor, 777 South Figueroa Street,
Los Angeles, CA 90071
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR., U.S. District Court, P.O. Box 791,
Wheeling, WV 26003
RANDALL P. BEZANSON, Washington and Lee University, School of Law,
Lexington, VA 24450, Reporter
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON, Suite 600, 1600 Broadway, Denver, CO 80202,
President (Member Ex Officio)
WILLIAM J. PIERCE, 1505 Roxbury Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48104,
Executive Director
DAVID PEEPLES, Court of Appeals, Bexar County Courthouse,
San Antonio, TX 78205, Chair. Division F (Member Ex Officio)
Review Committee
LEWIS V. VAFIADES, P.O. Box 919, 23 Water Street, Bangor,
ME 04402, Chair
W. MICHAEL DUNN, P.O. Box 3701, 1000 Elm Street, Manchester,
NH 03105
RAYMOND P. PEPE, lth Floor, 240 North Third Street, Harrisburg,
PA 17101
Copies of this Act and copies of all Uniform and Model Acts
and other printed matter issued by the Conference may be obtained
from:
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700
Chicago, Illinois 60611
312/915-0195
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:21
THE UNIFORM DEFAMATION ACT
UNIFORM DEFAMATION ACT
PREFATORY NOTE
Since the United States Supreme Court recognized the
First Amendment limitations on the common law tort of defamation,
courts have struggled to find the proper balance between the
constitutionally protected guarantees of free expression and the
need to protect citizens from reputational harm. In addition new
technologies for information distribution have caused tension
within the traditional rules of the defamation tort. The Scope
and Program Committee recognized, as have other commentators,
that the state of the law is in chaos and that some issues may
not be fit for judicial resolution.
The central question that animates this draft is
whether there is a way to provide additional protection for
reputational harm without interfering with legitimate First
Amendment concerns. There is empirical evidence to suggest that
many targets of defamatory statements would be satisfied with
vindication, that is with a determination that the statement was
false. A fair reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests
that the constitutional privileges accorded speakers in
defamation cases are designed to insure that the threat of
monetary awards for potentially defamatory statements will not
chill speech.
The draft attempts to balance these concerns by
affording plaintiffs an option of seeking vindication alone,
rather than money damages. In addition, incentives are created
throughout the Act to encourage plaintiffs to accept vindication
as a complete remedy. The draft also attempts to provide
defamation defendants with incentives to respond with retractions
or corrections when their published statements are in error.
Finally, and within the framework of still-evolving
constitutional doctrine, the draft reflects an effort to bring an
important measure of clarity and consistency to the adjudication
of defamation actions, and to effect needed changes in such areas
as compensatory and punitive damages, privileges, and retraction.
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2 SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:
3 (1) "Defamation" means a statement tending to harm
4 reputation.
5 (2) "Pecuniary damage" means provable economic loss.
6 (3) "Person" means an individual, corporation,
7 business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint
8 venture, or other legal or commercial entity, but does not
9 include a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or
10 instrumentality.
11 (4) "Publication" means an intentional or negligent
12 communication to a person other than the person alleging
13 reputational harm from the communication.
14 COMMENT TO SECTION 1
15 By the definition of "person," which does not include
16 products or services, and by the requirement in Section 2 that a
17 publication harm the reputation of a "person," the Act is made
18 inapplicable to product disparagement or trade libel claims, as
19 well as to the increasing variety of defamation-like false or
20 misleading advertising claims. The definition also excludes from
21 liability under the Act libels of government or governmental
22 bodies, which are constitutionally immune from liability under
23 the First Amendment (as distinguished from libels of public
24 officials, which are not excluded and with respect to which
25 actions may be brought under the Act).
26 Under Section 1 (4) "publication" is defined as an
27 intentional or negligent communication to a person other than the
28 person alleging reputational harm from a communication. This
29 definition is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
30 Section 577 (1). By the requirement that a communication be
31 "intentional or negligent," the definition excludes
32 communications to a third person that are the result of mistake
33 or inadvertence, as long as the mistake or inadvertence is non-
34 negligent. The Act, like the Restatement, includes this
35 qualification as part of the definition of publication, rather
3
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1 than as a defense to liability, thereby making clear that the
2 concepts of intentional or negligent communication go to the act
3 of communicating, not, as with the privileges contained in
4 Sections 9 (negligence) and Sections 17 and 18 (malice), to the
5 content of a communication.
6 SECTION 2. ELEMENTS OF CLAIM. A person who causes the
7 publication of a false and defamatory factual statement about
8 another person which harms that person's reputation is subject to
9 liability to that person in an action under this [Act]. Factual
10 statement means a communication that is reasonably understood by
11 recipients to be of a factual nature and is objectively provable
12 or disprovable.
13 COMMENT TO SECTION 2
14 A number of features of the Act should be noted in
15 connection with Section 2, which sets out the elements of the
16 legal wrong. First, no distinction is made between slander and
17 libel. The distinction is now largely anachronistic, and the
18 rules of liability per se and related requirements for proof of
19 harm and damage that turned on the distinction are not retained
20 in the Act. All defamations are made subject to the same rules.
21 Second, no distinction is drawn an the basis of the
22 medium employed in the publication, or the media or non-media
23 identity of the offending publisher. Differences in the impact
24 of a given medium can, of course, be relevant on a case-by-case
25 basis under such headings as audience interpretation of meaning,
26 reputational harm, and damage. The media/non-media distinction,
27 generally employed as a means of distinguishing press or mass
28 communication from private individual communication, is not used
29 in the Act because, while occasionally of analytical utility, it
30 is difficult to define and was considered unnecessary. Private
31 speech is protected equally with public speech under the Act.
32 The use of the term "factual statement" protects
33 statements of opinion from liability, although not in so many
34 words. By requiring as a condition of liability that a
35 communication be a factual statement, based on reasonable
36 interpretation of the recipient, and that it be disprovable and
37 disproven by the injured party (see Section 3), statements of an
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1 evaluative, judgmental, or general and open-ended character, as
2 well as statements not reasonably understood as factual, are not
3 made actionable under the Act. See Hustler Magazine. Inc. v.
4 Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
5 The definition contained in Section 2 follows the
6 approach taken by the Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 111
7 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1990). This approach is consistent with, although a
8 somewhat different formulation of, the position taken in the
9 Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 566 (1977), which provides
10 that "A statement in the form of an opinion . . . is
11 actionable . . . if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
12 defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." In a related
13 fashion, Section 563 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
14 provides that "[t]he meaning of a communication is that which the
15 recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands
16 that it was intended to express." Both of these ideas have been
17 incorporated in the definition of "fact."
18 By using "factual statement" to mean information that
19 is "reasonably understood by recipients to be of a factual nature
20 and that is objectively provable or disprovable," the Act avoids
21 the need to define "opinion," or to provide a separate privilege
22 for opinion. The Act therefore departs from the approach taken
23 by many courts prior to the Milkovich case, in which a four or
24 five factor analysis was used to define opinion as a matter of
25 law. Many of the same considerations (such as whether the
26 context of the statement is one ordinarily associated with
27 satire, hyperbole, or pure opinion) will still apply, but they
28 will be more fact-based and dependent on the particular
29 circumstances of each case, and not on presumptive categories of
30 statement.
31 The Act rests liability on the reasonable understanding
32 or interpretation given a statement. For example, the statement
33 that "it is rumored that X is a thief" could not escape liability
34 simply because the fact of rumors is true. If in its context the
35 statement is interpreted reasonably as implying that X is a
36 thief, that will be the relevant issue in an action under the
37 Act, not simply the correctness of the assertion that rumors
38 exist.
39 SECTION 3. BURDEN OF PROOF. In an action under this [Act]:
40 (1) The plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
41 preponderance of the evidence:
42 (i) publication;
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1 (ii) defamation;
2 (iii) harm to reputation; and
3 (iv) falsity.
4 (2) The plaintiff bears the burden of proving by clear
5 and convincing evidence:
6 (i) abuse of privilege;
7 (ii) negligence; and
8 (iii) knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
9 for truth.
10 (3) The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
11 amount of damages with reasonable certainty.
12 (4) The defendant bears the burden of proving by a
13 preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to establish a
14 privilege.
15 CONNENT TO SECTION 3
16 In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984),
17 the Supreme Court held that issues of constitutional fact, such
18 as actual malice and, presumably, negligence, must be proved by
19 clear and convincing evidence. Because abuse of privilege
20 issues, such as common law malice or publication beyond the
21 protected scope of a privilege, are of similar character and
22 importance, the higher standard is applied to these issues, as
23 well.
24 In outlining the burden of asserting and proving
25 privilege, the Act is intended to reflect the common rule that
26 one who asserts privilege has the burden of raising it and, if
27 questions of fact are involved, of proving them by a
28 preponderance of the evidence. The Act does not, however,
29 purport to allocate factual issues involved in privilege matters
30 between the judge and jury, but rather leaves these issues to
31 local practice.
32 The plaintiff must prove the fact of damage by a
33 preponderance of the evidence under subsection 1. The Act adopts
34 the Restatement requirement that the amount of damages be proved
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1 with reasonable certainty. This requirement applies, of course,
2 not only to pecuniary and economic damages, but also to damages
3 flowing from harm to reputation.
4 SECTION 4. PLEADINGS; EXPEDITED PROCEEDING.
5 (a) In addition to other matters required by [the
6 rules of procedure for civil actions], the complaint [petition]
7 must:
8 (1) identify with particularity the specific
9 statements alleged to be false and defamatory and the time and
10 place of their publication;
11 (2) state the alleged defamatory meaning and
12 identify the specific circumstances giving rise to it if the
13 defamatory meaning arises from implication rather than or in
14 addition to ordinary meaning, or from innuendo, sarcasm, or
15 conduct;
16 (3) state that the alleged defamatory meaning is
17 false;
18 (4) include a copy of each retraction and each
19 request for retraction; and
20 (5) identify whether the action brought is one
21 for damages under Section 9 or for vindication under Section 5.
22 (b) If upon motion by the plaintiff the court finds
23 that the plaintiff is likely to suffer significant additional
24 reputational harm from repetition of the statement, the court may
25 expedite the proceeding.
1 COMMENT TO SECTION 4
2 Section 4 provides that a plaintiff filing a complaint
3 under the Act must describe the subject communication in
4 sufficient detail adequately to inform the defendant of the
5 subject of the suit. This section imposes special requirements
6 in defamation actions that extend beyond the requirements
7 generally imposed for all pleadings under state laws. Although
8 some states require particularity of pleading in libel actions,
9 see N.Y. CPLR Law § 3016(a) (McKinney 1974), current law is
10 largely silent on how particularly a cause of action for
11 defamation must be pled. Consequently, in some states a
12 plaintiff may append a copy of a book or a lengthy article to the
13 complaint, accompanied by very generalized allegations, thus
14 forcing the defendant to deduce the part of the publication that
15 is objectionable to the plaintiff. Particularity of pleading
16 makes the defendant immediately aware of the subject of the suit
17 and thus promotes efficiency and facilitates early steps to
18 retract the communication or to settle the suit.
19 Subsection (a) requires that the exact offending words
20 or conduct be set out in the complaint. A plaintiff may not give
21 a general description of the communication limited by terms such
22 as "to the effect" or "substantially." Furthermore, if only a
23 portion of a communication is actionable, the plaintiff must
24 specify in the complaint the actionable portion.
25 If the ordinary meaning of the subject communication
26 does not give rise to a cause of action under the Act, but the
27 circumstances surrounding the communication imply a meaning to
28 the communication other than the ordinary meaning, the plaintiff
29 must plead the specific circumstances. In a case involving
30 innuendo, sarcasm, or a statement accompanied by conduct, the
31 plaintiff must state the alleged implicit meaning.
32 Subsection (b) provides that a plaintiff who alleges
33 continuing injury from a communication that is being repeatedly
34 published may seek to have the proceeding expedited. At least
35 one state currently provides for an expedited proceeding. Cal.
36 Civ. Proc. Code § 460.5 (West 1973). Inclusion of this
37 subsection reflects a judgment that plaintiffs, who are not
38 eligible for injunctions but who nonetheless are being injured by
39 a continuous publication, should have an opportunity to obtain
40 relief earlier than normal litigation procedures would provide.
41 The court, however, is given full discretion in the matter.
42
43 SECTION 5. ACTION FOR VINDICATION: REQUIRED PROOF;
44 EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. A person bringing an action under this [Act]
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1 may elect, at the time of filing a complaint (petition], to limit
2 the action to an action for vindication. If the election is
3 made:
4 (1) the plaintiff must prove the elements stated in
5 Section 2;
6 (2) the publisher may not assert absence of fault or
7 claims of conditional privilege;
8 (3) damages may not be awarded; and
9 (4) except as provided in Section 7(b), the plaintiff
10 may not bring an action for damages for reputational or dignitary
11 injury caused by publication of the false statement.
12 COMMENT TO SECTION 5
13 Section 5 provides an alternative cause of action to
14 the traditional action for damages. The cause of action is one
15 for vindication, by which a successful plaintiff can obtain a
16 written and published finding of fact on the question of falsity,
17 but without the opportunity for any form of money damages.
18 Defenses to the action are likewise limited. Claims of absolute
19 privilege can be raised and, if successful, will defeat an action
20 for vindication, but claims of conditional privilege, including
21 constitutional privileges based on negligence or actual malice,
22 may not be raised.
23 SECTION 6. ACTION FOR VINDICATION: TERMINATION BY
24 DEFENDANT. If at any time within 90 days after service of
25 process in an action for vindication a defendant by motion
26 stipulates on the record that it does not assert the truth of the
27 statement or did not intend to assert its truth at the time of
28 publication, or both, and agrees to publish, at the plaintiff's
29 request, a sufficient retraction, the court shall, after the
9
1 required publication, dismiss the action against the defendant
2 making the motion. Neither party may recover attorney's fees or
3 expenses under Section 8.
4 COMENT TO SECTION 6
5 Section 6 provides, in substance, a counterpart to the
6 offer of termination provision contained in Section 12, which is
7 applicable only to actions for damages. The purpose of Section 6
8 is to permit -- indeed, to encourage -- the termination of a
9 vindication action if the defendant is willing to disclaim any
10 assertion of truth, and to publish that disclaimer. It is
11 important to note that the defendant need not concede falsity.
12 That is something that defendants are rarely willing to do, and
13 are rarely in a position to do. A clear disclaimer of the
14 assertion of truth, however, was judged to provide both
15 significant and realistic relief for a plaintiff.
16 SECTION 7. ACTION FOR VINDICATION: FINDINGS OF FACT;
17 DEFAULT BY DEFENDANT.
18 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if the
19 plaintiff prevails in an action brought pursuant to Section 5,
20 the court shall enter judgment which shall include written
21 findings of fact on falsity and an order requiring the defendant,
22 at the defendant's option:
23 (1) to publish the findings in conformance with
24 Section 15(b)(1); or
25 (2) to pay the plaintiff an amount sufficient to
26 secure their publication in conformance with Section 15(b)(1).
27 (b) If the defendant makes a motion pursuant to
28 Section 6, but fails within a reasonable time to publish a
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1 sufficient retraction at the plaintiff's request, the plaintiff
2 may:
3 (1) amend the complaint to assert a claim for
4 damages against the defendant under Section 9; or
5 (2) introduce evidence of falsity and, if the
6 court finds the proof of falsity adequate, it shall enter
7 judgment which shall include written findings of fact on falsity
8 and order the defendant to pay an amount sufficient to secure
9 publication of the findings in conformance with Section 15(b)(1).
10 SECTION 8. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN AN ACTION FOR
11 VINDICATION.
12 (a) In an action brought under Section 5, reasonable
13 expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees, shall be
14 awarded:
15 (1) to a prevailing plaintiff upon proof that the
16 defendant was provided sufficient grounds for retraction in the
17 plaintiff's request for retraction, and that a timely retraction
18 was unreasonably refused; or
19 (2) to a prevailing defendant upon proof that the
20 plaintiff had no reasonable basis upon which to allege falsity.
21 (b) An award of expenses and attorney's fees to a
22 prevailing party under this section may not be disproportionate
23 to the reasonable value of those incurred by the other party for
24 its own expenses and attorney's fees.
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1 • COMMENT TO SECTION 8
2 Section 8(a)(2) is the only provision in the Act which
3 permits defendants to receive reasonable expenses of litigation,
4 including attorney's fees. Awarding fees in vindication actions
5 in which plaintiffs allege falsity without reasonable basis
6 seemed appropriate in view of the fact that defendants in such
7 cases are precluded from claiming any but absolute privileges.
8 The potential award of fees was also seen as an effective
9 deterrent against plaintiffs bringing frivolous vindication
10 actions.
11 The term "expenses of litigation, including attorney's
12 fees" is intended to be inclusive of all costs of litigation, and
13 therefore to be broader than the recovery of attorney's fees and
14 costs. Recoverable expenses could include, for example, the
15 costs of witnesses, experts, travel, and the like.
16 The amount of recoverable expenses is effectively
17 limited by the requirement that the award be proportionate to the
18 expenses of the party from whom recovery is made. In most cases
19 this will result in setting the amount awarded at a level no
20 higher than the actual expenses of the other party, although the
21 possibility of pro bono representation, for example, led to the
22 use of "reasonable value" in order that free services to one
23 party not defeat a reasonable award to the other party.
24 SECTION 9. ACTION FOR DAMAGES..
25 (a) A plaintiff may recover damages in an action under
26 this Act if the plaintiff proves the elements of a cause of
27 action stated in Section 2 and also proves:
28 (1) in a case involving a conditional privilege,
29 that the defendant published the statement with knowledge of its
30 falsity or reckless disregard for its truth, or
31 (2) in all other cases, that the defendant knew
32 or reasonably should have known the statement was false.
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1 (b) A plaintiff entitled to recover damages under
2 subsection (a) may recover:
3 (1) damages for harm to reputation and resulting
4 emotional distress; and
5 (2) pecuniary damages caused by the publication.
6 CONMENT TO SECTION 9
7 Section 9 requires a showing of negligence or, for
8 public official and public figure cases as well as for other
9 cases in which conditional privilege is successfully established,
10 of actual malice, in all cases in which damages are sought.
11 Under current law strict liability still applies to certain,
12 although highly limited, settings of purely private libel. See
13 Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun&
14 Bradstreet. Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. Inc., 472 U.S. 749
15 (1985). The Act reflects the judgment that all speech should be
16 equally protected irrespective of context, that in any event
17 distinctions between fault-based and strict liability are
18 unnecessarily confusing and conducive to litigation, and that the
19 remaining instances of strict liability under the United States
20 Supreme Court's decisions are so narrow as to be of doubtful
21 utility as a matter of policy.
22 It should also be noted that general or presumed
23 damages are foreclosed under the Act. Moreover, by requiring
24 that damages for emotional distress result from harm to
25 reputation, the Act is intended to foreclose recovery for "pure"
26 emotional distress, and to limit the scope of emotional distress
27 damages recoverable.
28 The Act uses the term "pecuniary damages," defined in
29 Section 1(2), to describe provable economic or out-of-pocket
30 losses caused by a publication. The term is intended to include
31 the types of damage described variously in state common law as
32 "pecuniary damage," "special damage," "economic loss," or "out-
33 of-pocket loss."
34 Of course, by virtue of Section 16, which forecloses
35 any action to which absolute privileges apply, no damages may be
36 recovered under Section 10 when absolute privilege is
37 established.
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1 (Alternative A)
2 [Committee Alternative]
3 (SECTION 10. PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROHIBITED. Punitive damages
4 may not be recovered in an action under this [Act].]
5 [Alternative B]
6 (SECTION 10. PUNITIVE DAMAGES. A plaintiff may recover
7 punitive damages under this [Act] only upon a showing by clear
8 and convincing evidence that the defendant published the
9 challenged statement with knowledge of its falsity and with ill
10 will toward the plaintiff. The provisions of [States should
11 insert a reference to such provisions generally applicable to
12 punitive damages as are appropriate] apply to the award of
13 punitive damages under this section.]
14 COMMENT TO SECTION 10
15 Pursuant to the Conference's action in 1991, a punitive
16 damage provision has been drafted in order that a narrow
17 alternative to complete prohibition of punitive damages will be
18 available at the time of final reading. The provision limits
19 punitive damages very strictly to cases in which the plaintiff
20 can prove knowledge of falsity (not reckless disregard for truth)
21 and ill will, or intent to harm.
22 Notwithstanding the limited nature of the punitive
23 damages provision, the Committee remains convinced that punitive
24 damages should not be available in any cases. The punitive
25 damage provision is therefore presented as an alternative to the
26 committee's recommendation. The action of the Committee of the
27 Whole in 1991 did not amend the Act to require punitive damages,
28 but rather required that an alternative provision allowing
29 punitive damages be drafted for possible consideration at the
30 time of final reading.
19921
72 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:21
1 SECTION 11. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN AN ACTION FOR
2 DAMAGES. In an action brought under Section 9, reasonable
3 expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees, may be awarded
4 to a prevailing plaintiff who:
5 (1) made an adequate request for retraction
6 within 60 days of publication; and
7 (2) proves that the challenged statement was
8 published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for
9 its truth.
10 SECTION 12. OFFER OF TERMINATION IN AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
11 (a) Any time before trial of an action for damages
12 under this [Act] a defendant, by motion, may make a termination
13 offer. In the motion the defendant shall stipulate on the record
14 that the defendant does not assert the truth of the statement or
15 did not intend to assert its truth at the time of publication, or
16 both, and the defendant shall agree:
17 (1) to pay the plaintiff's reasonable expenses of
18 litigation, including attorney's fees, incurred prior to the
19 filing of the motion; and
20 (2) to publish, at the plaintiff's request, a
21 sufficient retraction.
22 (b) If the plaintiff accepts the offer, the court
23 shall dismiss the action against the defendant after the
24 defendant fully complies with its terms. A plaintiff who does
1 not accept the termination offer is limited to pecuniary damages
2 and may not recover from the defendant making the offer the
3 expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees.
4 SECTION 13. REQUEST FOR RETRACTION.
5 (a) To be adequate, a request for retraction must:
6 (1) be made in writing and signed by the
7 requester or by the requester's authorized agent;
a (2) identify with particularity the specific
9 statements alleged to be false and defamatory and the time and
10 place of their publication;
11 (3) state the alleged defamatory meaning and
12 identify the specific circumstances giving rise to it if the
13 defamatory meaning arises from implication rather than or in
14 addition to ordinary meaning, or from innuendo, sarcasm, or
15 conduct; and
16 (4) state that the alleged defamatory meaning is
17 false.
18 (b) If an adequate request has not previously been
19 made, service of a [summons and complaint [petition]] in
20 conformance with Section 4 constitutes an adequate request for
21 retraction and the time for filing a responsive pleading is
22 suspended during the period provided in Section 15 for responding
23 to the request.
24 COMMENT TO SECTION 13
25 The retraction provisions of the Act (Sections 13 - 15)
26 should be read as a whole. These sections represent a
16
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1 careful balancing of the interests of plaintiffs and defendants,
2 and are designed to encourage the prompt informal settlement of
3 defamation claims.
4 Section 13 contains the general requirement that a
5 retraction be sought as a precondition to suit. Section 13(b)
6 however, provides that in all cases a complaint shall constitute
7 such a request, thus avoiding the preclusive effect of an
8 inadequate earlier request or a failure to seek a retraction for
9 any other reason. A retraction serves to limit or eliminate the
10 damages caused by a communication. Unlike many current
11 retraction statutes, Section 13 does not require a party to seek
12 a retraction within a certain time period following publication.
13 Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99-1 (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.05 (West
14 1983). A party may seek a retraction at any time prior to the
15 expiration of the statute of limitations. Sections 11 and 14,
16 however, are designed, respectively, to encourage an early
17 request for retraction, and a favorable response.
18 Subsection (b) provides that the complaint shall
19 constitute a request for retraction if no adequate retraction has
20 been sought before the action is filed. This provision relieves
21 the plaintiff of the obligation to request a retraction at some
22 point before filing, although the Act is not intended to
23 encourage that procedure. Indeed, Section 11 provides an
24 incentive for an early request, as will, presumably, the
25 plaintiff's own interest in reputational vindication. The
26 principal reason for Section 13(b) is to provide a cure in all
27 cases for potential claims that the request for retraction was
28 deficient in form or content, and for the attendant difficulties
29 such claims might needlessly pose under the statute of
30 limitations.
31 A publisher who has received a request for retraction
32 prior to the filing of an action, and who considers that request
33 to have been deficient, should therefore consider the complaint
34 to constitute a new request for retraction requiring the
35 publisher's response. Failure to give due notice of the
36 publisher's intent to consider the complaint a request for
37 retraction in such circumstances and, if necessary, to suspend
38 the time for response, should constitute a waiver of any
39 objections to the prior retraction request.
40 SECTION 14. EFFECT OF RETRACTION. If a timely and
41 sufficient retraction is published, a person may not bring an
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1 action for vindication based on the challenged statement under
2 Section 5, and a person who brings an action for damages under
3 Section 9 may recover damages only for pecuniary loss caused
4 before the date of the retraction.
5 COMMENT TO SECTION 14
6 Section 14 is designed to encourage parties to grant a
7 request for retraction by providing that a retraction forecloses
8 an action under Section 5, and that in an action for damages the
9 requesting party may seek only pecuniary damages in the event of
10 the publication of a retraction. Additionally, by refusing the
11 request, a publisher is subject under Section 11 to a possible
12 award of attorney's fees if the requesting party thereafter
13 prevails in an action, proves actual malice, and has sought the
14 retraction promptly.
15 Consideration was given to a section prohibiting
16 introduction of evidence on the granting or refusal of a
17 retraction in subsequent proceedings. Such a provision was not
18 included because such information should rarely if ever be
19 relevant -- particularly on questions of falsity, negligence, or
20 malice at the time of publication -- under current law, and an
21 absolute ban even for exculpatory uses or extreme cases was
22 deemed unwise.
23 In limiting recovery of damages for pecuniary loss to
24 those "caused before the date of the retraction," the Act
25 attempts to cut off damage which arises after or is caused after
26 the retraction, but not to prevent the recovery of damages caused
27 prior to the retraction, but which may extend beyond the date of
28 retraction. For example, if a physician is defamed and a
29 retraction thereafter made, the physician should be able to
30 recover damages for economic loss stemming from the loss of
31 patients prior to the date of the retraction, even though that
32 loss may continue for some period after the retraction. On the
33 other hand, economic losses resulting from patients who changed
34 doctors after the date of a retraction should not be recoverable,
35 even though their decision was based upon the original
36 defamation. At a trial of an action in which the defendant has
37 published a retraction in accordance with Section 14, the
38 plaintiff will bear the burden of proving damages caused by the
39 publication before the retraction.
40 It should be noted that under Section 14 a publisher
41 may unilaterally retract and limit damages to pecuniary loss.
42 This feature is designed to encourage publishers quickly to
18
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1 correct mistakes and thereby avoid much of the harm that may flow
2 from the publication.
3 SECTION 15. TIMELY AND SUFFICIENT RETRACTION.
4 (a) A retraction is timely if it is published before
5 or within 30 days after receipt of a request pursuant to Section
6 13.
7 (b) A retraction is sufficient if it:
8 (1) is communicated in writing to the requester,
9 is published in a manner and medium reasonably calculated to
10 reach substantially the same audience as the publication
11 complained of, and, if the retraction is published in another
12 medium to conform to the 30-day period required by subsection
13 (a), is also published in the next practicable issue or edition,
14 if any, of the original publication; and
15 (2) refers to the challenged statement and:
16 (i) corrects the challenged statement;
17 (1i) in the case of a statement implied by a
18 publication, or arising from innuendo, sarcasm, or accompanying
19 conduct, disclaims any intent to communicate or to have
20 communicated the implied meaning or to assert its truth; or
21 (iii) in the case of a statement attributed to
22 another person, identifies that person and disclaims any intent
23 to assert or to have asserted the truth of the statement.
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1 (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), a retraction is
2 sufficient if the plaintiff agrees in writing that it is
3 sufficient.
4 CONDENT TO SECTION 15
5 Section 15 sets out the requirements for a timely and
6 sufficient retraction. A "timely" retraction must be published
7 within 30 days of a request for retraction. A "sufficient"
8 retraction must be published in substantially the same manner and
9 medium as the original communication unless publication in some
10 other manner and medium is reasonably calculated to reach the
11 same audience as the original communication.
12 The important factors in determining whether a
13 retraction is sufficient are reasonableness and whether the
14 efforts are directed at reaching the same audience. Where
15 publication is frequent, the retraction question is not likely to
16 be problematic. Given the scope of the (Act], however, the
17 obligation to retract will apply to all forms of communication,
18 some of which will be narrowly focused, infrequent, and even one-
19 time only. In many of these settings the (Act's] focus on
20 reasonable efforts to reach the same audience will be important.
21 Newspapers and other frequent publications have been
22 the principal subjects of retraction statutes throughout the
23 country. Ordinarily retractions are required to be placed in
24 similar locations to those in which the original story occurred,
25 although even this rule is dependent upon a number of factors,
26 including the nature and scope of the original story as well as
27 the newspaper's practices concerning reserved space for
28 corrections. Such alternatives, as well as others presented in
29 different types of media, such as radio and broadcast, should be
30 addressed in terms of the Act's requirement that the retraction,
31 in its location and prominence, should be reasonably calculated
32 to reach substantially the same audience as the original
33 publication.
34 With other media and in other contexts, however, the
35 rule will yield different results. For example, retraction of a
36 defamatory employee reference or evaluation may require no more
37 than contacting those persons or firms to whom the defamatory
38 statement was communicated. If the statement has made its way
39 into permanent files or broader audiences, however, reasonable
40 efforts to have the material removed from such files or to
41 communicate the retraction to identifiable members of the broader
42 audience should be attempted.
43 For a book currently being sold, with no next edition
44 in sight, reasonable efforts to retract might involve several
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1 measures: make necessary corrections in any future editions;
2 notify persons who have purchased the book, if that information
3 is available, or instead attempt through a notice at bookstores
4 or a press release to reach this group; and provide through an
5 insert or other warning notice to those persons who will, in the
6 future, buy the current edition. The latter step assumes, of
7 course, that future reputational harm can be avoided by such an
8 insert rather than by recalling and correcting books that are on
9 the shelf but unsold.
10 In the case of an oral defamation to friends or
11 colleagues -- a classic slander -- a letter to those persons
12 retracting the defamation (ungrudgingly, of course) might
13 suffice, on the assumption that word of the apologetic retraction
14 would spread as rapidly in the channels of gossip as did the
15 original defamation.
16 Under subsection (b)(2) a "sufficient" retraction must
17 also correct the original communication. An equivocal retraction
18 will not satisfy this requirement. But where the alleged
19 defamation was the result of an implication contained in a
20 communication or a statement attributed in the publication to
21 another person, a sufficient retraction need only contain a
22 statement that the party making the communication did not intend
23 the implication and disclaims it, or that in publishing the
24 attributed statement of another person the publisher disclaims
25 any intent to attest to the truth of the facts contained therein.
26 This will allow the publisher to disavow the alleged implication
27 and yet stand behind the "facts" of the story.
28 It is important to note that in the case of statements
29 attributed to another person, the retraction must identify that
30 person even if the original publication did not do so.
31 SECTION 16. ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGES. An action may not be
32 maintained under this [Act] based on:
33 (1) a statement made:
34 (1) in and pertaining to a judicial proceeding by
35 a judge, attorney, witness, juror, or other participant;
36 (ii) in and pertaining to a legislative proceeding
37 by a legislator, attorney, aide, witness, or other participant;
38 or
I (iii) in and pertaining to any quasi-judicial or
2 quasi-legislative executive or administrative proceeding by an
3 executive or administrative official, attorney, witness, or other
4 participant;
5 (2) a statement that constitutes a fair and accurate
6 report of an official action or proceeding of a governmental
7 body, including an order or opinion of a court, or of a meeting
8 of a governmental body which is open to the public;
9 (3) a statement published with the consent of the
10 person harmed;
11 (4) a statement communicated between husband and wife;
12 or
13 (5) a statement required by law to be published.
14 COMMENT TO SECTION 16
15 In listing the absolute privileges applicable to
16 defamation actions, it is intended that Section 16 contain a
17 statement of all such privileges. This is consistent with the
18 desire to make uniform the basic practices applicable to the
19 defamation tort. Two caveats should, however, be noted. First,
20 the privileges are stated in very general terms, and therefore
21 are intended to allow for minor differences in scope and
22 interpretation that exist from state to state. Such differences
23 would exist, for example, in the specific application of the
24 privileges pertaining to judicial, legislative, and quasi-
25 judicial or quasi-legislative proceedings, as well as
26 interpretations of the particular individuals who may be able to
27 claim protection under the privilege. For a sense of some of the
28 variations, see Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 115 (5th
29 ed. 1984); Restatement (second) of Torts, §§ 582-592A (A.L.I.
30 1977). Second, the absolute privileges are not stated in the
31 exclusive, and therefore the section is not designed to foreclose
32 the development of further absolute privileges at common law or
33 as a matter of constitutional requirement. The statement of
34 privileges does, however, constitute a full listing of absolute
35 privileges generally recognized in current law.
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1 Section 16(4) provides an absolute privilege for
2 communications between husband and wife. At common law there has
3 not been, historically speaking, such a privilege, although such
4 statements have not been subject to liability on the ground that
5 there was no publication. The more common view today is that the
6 publication rule in such cases was an artifice, and that the
7 better approach would be to privilege such statements directly.
8 That is the approach taken in the current draft.
9
10 The absolute privileges stated in Section 16 are not
11 intended to exclude other absolute privileges that may stem from
12 other sources of law. For example, privileges stemming from the
13 federal speech and debate clause, U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 6, ch. 1,
14 their counterparts at the state level, and other legislative,
15 executive, and judicial privileges are available even though not
16 mentioned in the Act. The source of these privileges is
17 generally to be found in statutory or constitutional provisions
18 not specifically applicable only to defamation claims. See Bar
19 v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
20 Claims of absolute privilege, whether listed in Section
21 16 or based on other law, may be raised in actions for
22 vindication under Section 5.
23 SECTION 17. CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGES.
24 (a) A person may not be held liable for damages based
25 on a statement that is:
26 (1) reasonably necessary to protect the
27 publisher's legitimate interests;
28 (2) reasonably necessary to protect the
29 legitimate interests of others;
30 (3) reasonably necessary to protect or foster a
31 common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the
32 communication; or
33 (4) made to a person officially charged with the
34 duty of acting in the public interest and in relation to that
35 person's official responsibilities.
23
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1 (b) The privileges under subsection (a) are not
2 available if the plaintiff proves that the publisher:
3 (1) unreasonably published the statement to
4 persons other than those to whom publication was necessary to
5 serve the interests giving rise to the privilege; or
6 (2) published the statement with knowledge of its
7 falsity or reckless disregard for its truth.
8 COMMENT TO SECTION 17
9 As with the statement of absolute privileges in Section
10 16, the Act provides a listing in Section 17 of the conditional
11 privileges at common law. The statement of privileges is general
12 so as to comprehend minor differences in interpretation in the
13 various states, and the privileges are not listed as exclusive in
14 order that additional privileges recognized in various states, or
15 which might arise in the future, not be foreclosed. The
16 privileges are drawn generally from the Restatement (Second) of
17 Torts, §S 594-598A (A.L.I. 1977).
18 The Act treats publications protected by conditional
19 privilege (i.e. the scope of publication comports with the
20 requirements of a privilege) in the same manner as statements
21 falling within the public figure and public official
22 constitutional privileges. Actual malice applies in both
23 contexts. This reflects a judgment that there is little policy
24 justification for treating common law and constitutional
25 privileges differently, and that much confusion can be avoided by
26 simplifying the standards for various privileges.
27 The fair comment privilege, formerly recognized in the
28 Restatement and still recognized in most jurisdictions, has not
29 been included, nor is it currently included in the Restatement.
30 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 606-610 (A.L.I. 1977). The
31 reason for not including the fair comment privilege is two-fold.
32 First, given that statements of opinion are not, by virtue of the
33 definition of factual statement in Section 2, actionable the
34 privilege is not necessary. Second, the other privileges in the
35 Act, including specifically the constitutional privileges
36 outlined in Section 18, were deemed to make the fair comment
37 privilege redundant, as those privileges would provide
38 overlapping, and often greater, protection.
39 It should be noted that the fair report privilege,
40 which applies to accurate and fair reports of official actions or
41 proceedings open to the public, is included in the listing of
24
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1 absolute privileges in Section 16(2). This privilege is
2 sometimes considered to be a qualified privilege, but the better
3 practice seems to be to consider it an absolute one, subject to
4 its qualifications of "accuracy" and "fairness."
5 Similarly, the protection of a person who provides a
6 means of publication for a privileged publisher, often described
7 as a "wire service" privilege, is not included in the Act, as the
8 constitutional privileges have made it unnecessary.
9 SECTION 18. CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR STATEMENTS CONCERNING
10 PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES. A person may not be held
11 liable for damages based on a statement about a public official
12 or a public figure unless the plaintiff proves that the statement
13 was:
14 (1) unrelated to the person's status as a public
15 official or public figure; or
16 (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
17 disregard for its truth.
18 COMMENT TO SECTION 18
19 Section 18 reflects the constitutional privileges
20 applicable to statements concerning public officials and public
21 figures. The statements must be related to the person's status
22 as a public official or public figure, and can be overcome only
23 upon a showing of actual malice. Section 18 is intended fairly
24 to reflect current law. The section does not affect future
25 developments except insofar as they might be less protective than
26 current law.
27 It should be noted that the negligence privilege
28 established for "private" libel plaintiffs in Gertz v. Robert
29 Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and its progeny is not
30 reflected in Section 18, but is instead contained in Section 9 as
31 a precondition to recovery of damages. Because negligence was
32 deemed an appropriate precondition to recovery of damages in any
33 type of defamation action, including purely private ones not
34 covered by Gertz, and because negligence is not required to be
35 proven in vindication actions under Section 5, the requirement
1 was placed in the damage section rather than stated as a
2 privilege.
3 The Act does not define "public official" and "public
4 figure," but instead relies on the Supreme Court's still-evolving
5 approach to the meaning of those terms. Under the Court's
6 current approach, the category of public officials includes
7 essentially all public employees, and public figures include
8 those persons, whether public employees or not, "who are ...
9 intimately involved in the resolution of important public
10 questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
11 concern to society at large." Curtis Publishint Co. v. Butts,
12 388 U.S. 130 (1967), quoted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
13 U.S. at 336-337, and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 111 L.Ed. 2d 1,
14 15 (1990). In both cases the constitutional privilege afforded a
15 publisher only applies to "a defamatory falsehood relating to (a
16 public official's] official conduct," or to the public figure's
17 relationship to a public issue. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal,
18 111 L.Ed. 2d, at 14, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
19 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964).
20 SECTION 19. LIABILITY OF REPUBLISHER. A person who
21 republishes a statement is subject to liability under this (Act]
22 as if the person were an original publisher.
23 COMMENT TO SECTION 19
24 Section 19 states the long-standing rule that persons
25 who republish information are subject to liability as if they
26 were the original publisher. Consideration was given to placing
27 conditions on liability for republication, such as the
28 foreseeability of harm, the reasonableness of reliance on the
29 original publisher, and the like, but it was concluded that the
30 various privileges contained in the Act would, taken together,
31 provide adequate protection for republishers in such
32 circumstances. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§
33 578, 581.
34 SECTION 20. LIABILITY FOR REPUBLICATION BY ANOTHER. A
35 publisher is subject to liability for harm caused by a reasonably
36 foreseeable republication by another person unless:
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1 (1) the publisher made a sufficient retraction prior
2 to the republication;
3 (2) the publisher did not publish with knowledge of
4 falsity or reckless disregard for truth, and requested the
5 republisher, before the republication, not to publish; or
6 (3) the republication was made or caused by the party
7 harmed.
8 COMMENT TO SECTION 20
9 Unlike the relatively straight-forward way that
10 liabilities of republishers have been dealt with in Section 19,
11 the Act provides a more specific outline of potential liability
12 of publishers for subsequent republication. Under Section 19 a
13 republisher is in a greater measure of control over its
14 liability, and has a full panoply of privileges available to it
15 as it makes a publication judgment. In contrast, Section 20
16 imposes liability on a former publisher for subsequent
17 publications over which that publisher may have no control and
18 little, if any, information. Accordingly, Section 20 limits
19 earlier publishers to liability only for reasonably foreseeable
20 republications, and even with respect to such publications
21 provides a safe harbor against liability for the former publisher
22 if a sufficient retraction has been made or if the former
23 publisher requests a republisher not to publish and if the former
24 publisher did not publish with actual malice.
25 It is assumed with respect to Sections 19 and 20 that
26 local law and existing third-party practice in various
27 jurisdictions will deal with questions of joint and several
28 liability, indemnification as between an original publisher and a
29 republisher, and the ability to join such parties in an action.
30 SECTION 21. INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SERVICES. A library,
31 archive, or similar information retrieval or transmission service
32 providing directly or through electronic or other means access to
33 information originally published by others is not subject to
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1 liability under Section 19 or 20 if the library, archive, or
2 similar information retrieval or transmission service:
3 (1) is not reasonably understood to assert in the
4 normal course of its business the truthfulness of the information
5 maintained or transmitted; or
6 (2) takes reasonable steps to inform users that it
7 does not assert the truthfulness of the information maintained or
8 transmitted.
9 COMNENT TO SECTION 21
10 Section 21 is designed to provide protection for the
11 increasing number of library-type information retrieval or data-
12 base sources of information, such as Lexis, Westlaw, Nexis, and
13 the like. Data-bases are increasingly serving as principal
14 sources for historical as well as contemporaneous information,
15 much like the traditional library or archive. The provision of
16 access to information through such library-type services is
17 protected under Section 21 if the person using a service would
18 not reasonably believe that the maintenance or provision of
19 access to the information carries any connotation as to its
20 truthfulness or reliability. In other words, as long as there is
21 reasonable notice in the ordinary course of business that the
22 truthfulness or reliability of the information is not asserted by
23 virtue of its maintenance and accessibility, the information
24 retrieval or transmission entity will bear no liability for
25 subsequent republication. Section 21(2) provides a "safe harbor"
26 by which the maintainer of such information may notify those
27 using it of the fact that the material's truthfulness is not
28 asserted and should not be relied upon. The provision of such
29 notification by, for example, a warning or disclaimer must be
30 reasonable in order to qualify for protection from liability.
31 It is assumed by the drafters that such traditional
32 facilities as public libraries, for example, would generally be
33 exempt from liability by virtue of Section 21(1), as it is
34 normally understood in the course of business that a public
35 library does not attest to the truthfulness of all of the
36 material and information contained within its collection.
37 The term "information . . . transmission service" used
38 in the Act is intended to cover not only pure transmission
39 services, but also computer bulletin boards. Such bulletin
40 boards, however, must be of such a nature that the users do not
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1 understand the transmitting service to attest to the truthfulness
2 of the information transmitted, or the service should so inform
3 the customers. In excluding such transmission services from
4 liability, the Act does not preclude liability against the person
5 or persons who originate a defamatory message which is carried on
6 the transmission service.
7 SECTION 22. SINGLE AND MULTIPLE PUBLICATIONS.
8 (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c),
9 each publication is a separate publication.
10 (b) A publication simultaneously received by more than
11 one person is a single publication.
12 (c) An aggregate and reasonably contemporaneous
13 publication is a single publication.
14 (d) As to any single-publication damages for all
15 resulting harm to a plaintiff must be recovered in a single
16 action under this [Act].
17 COMMENT TO SECTION 22
18 The single publication rule under Section 22(a)-(c) is
19 drawn, although with significant drafting changes, from the
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A (A.L.I. 1977). See also the
21 Uniform Single Publication Act (1952) which, while different in
22 form from the Act and the Restatement, is similar in substance.
23 The Act treats "aggregate and reasonably contemporaneous"
24 publications as single publications. This differs in approach
25 from the Restatement, which uses the term "aggregate" but also
26 specifies that any "edition of a book or a newspaper, a radio or
27 television broadcast, and an exhibition of a motion picture" is a
28 single publication. Given technological change, these
29 particularized categories are both incomplete and outdated. In
30 their place, the twin ideas of aggregation and contemporaneous
31 publication were used. The Act is not intended to change the
32 rule with respect to motion pictures, books, newspaper, radio,
33 and TV, nor is it intended to change the basic underlying
34 approach reflected in the Restatement as it will in the future be
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1 applied to new technologies, such as rental and home movies, pay
2 TV, and the like.
3 Subsection (d) departs from the Restatement in that it
4 concerns only the recovery of damages from all jurisdictions in
5 the action, and puts that provision in mandatory, rather than
6 permissive, terms. Section 577A (4)(c) of the Restatement
7 (Second) of Torts also bars recovery of damages between the same
8 parties in all jurisdictions. Such a provision was not included
9 in the Act because of its doubtful enforceability in other
10 jurisdictions and because doctrines of issue preclusion and res
11 judicata would likely address many of the problems.
12 SECTION 23. SURVIVABILITY OF CLAIMS; DEFAMATION OF DECEASED
13 PERSON.
14 (a) A claim arising under this [Act) survives the
15 death of the harmed individual, but only to the extent that the
16 claim is for vindication under Section 5 or for the recovery of
17 pecuniary damages. This section does not affect the
18 survivability of other claims arising from the publication.
19 (b) A person who publishes a statement concerning a
20 deceased person is not liable under this (Act] to the estate of
21 the deceased person or the deceased person's relatives.
22 COMMENT TO SECTION 23
23 Section 23 departs from the common law rule of non-
24 survivability of defamation claims, as well as the common
25 practice in state survival statutes to exclude defamation claims
26 from their reach. See Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 126
27 (5th ed. 1984). Under the Act defamation claims that arise
28 before the death of a plaintiff survive that person's death. A
29 rule of non-survivability was considered unfair, as it would
30 require the termination of litigation, for example, upon the
31 death of the plaintiff, and would foreclose the recovery of
32 damages for pecuniary harm experienced by the deceased plaintiff,
33 or the vindication of that person's reputation. It is noteworthy
34 in this connection that defamation actions are not uniformly non-
35 survivable, depending instead on the survival statute in
36 particular states, and that in some states survivability is
37 restricted to pecuniary damages (on the ground that recovery of
30
88 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:21
1 emotional damage would represent a windfall to the estate) or
2 excludes exemplary or punitive damages. Id. Given the Act's
3 limitation on recoverable damages, the survivability provision
4 was deemed to be a reasonable compromise of the competing
5 interests.
6 Section 23 does not, however, change the general rule
7 that a deceased person cannot be defamed. The provision dealing
8 with defamation of deceased persons is drawn from the Restatement
9 (Second) of Torts, Section 560 (1977).
10 SECTION 24. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY; OTHER ACTIONS.
11 This (Act] provides the exclusive remedy for
12 reputational or dignitary harm to a person caused by the
13 publication of a false statement.
14 COMMENT TO SECTION 24
15 Section 24 is intended to foreclose all other claims
16 based on reputational or dignitary harm arising from and based
17 upon the falsity of a published statement. This would foreclose
18 such claims as emotional distress, negligence, and false light
19 privacy, but not claims based, for example, on privacy invasion
20 for which the falsity is irrelevant. The preclusive effect of
21 Section 24 is limited to causes of action that depend on the
22 publication of false fact, and in which the injury is at least in
23 part attributable to the falsity. Thus a claim arising in
24 privacy, for example, which involves published falsity but which
25 does not depend on that falsity for proof of the claim or of
26 injury, would not be precluded. But when such a claim does
27 depend upon falsity, the Act precludes it even if the remedy
28 provided in such a claim is for dignitary (e.g., privacy) harm
29 rather than harm to reputation.
30 SECTION 25. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
31 (a) A claim under this (Act] is barred unless an
32 action is commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction within
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1 five years after the publication or, in the case of a claim
2 against a publisher based on a subsequent republication by
3 another publisher, within 10 years after the publication from
4 which the republication was derived.
5 (b) Within the period of limitations established by
6 subsection (a), a claim is barred one year after the plaintiff
7 knew or should have known of the publication or republication.
8 (c) The limitation periods of this section are
9 suspended during the period provided in Section 15(a) for
10 responding to a request for retraction.
11 (d) For purposes of this section, the date of
12 publication printed on or contained within a publication is the
13 date of publication, unless later publication is proved.
14 COMMENT TO SECTION 25
15 Section 25 contains two provisions addressing
16 limitations on actions. First, it balances the interests of both
17 parties to a suit under the Act by adopting a rule based on
18 plaintiff's discovery of the publication but strictly limiting
19 the period for filing suit once discovery is or should have been
20 made and precluding all suits after five years of the
21 publication. Second, it provides a ten-year limitation for suits
22 based on republication covered by Section 20.
23 Subsection (b) provides that a plaintiff must commence
24 a suit under the Act within one year of the plaintiff's actual or
25 constructive knowledge of the publication. Although most states
26 provide a one-year statute of limitations on libel actions, state
27 statutes vary as to when the limitations period begins. Some
28 states provide that a libel cause of action accrues when the
29 publication is made, see N.Y. CPLR Law S 215 (McKinney 1974);
30 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-201 (Smith-Hurd 1934), while
31 other states provide that a libel cause of action does not accrue
32 until the plaintiff learns of the publication. Cal. Civ. Proc.
33 Code § 340(3) (West 1982). Basing the statute of limitations on
34 the point of the publication has the advantage of providing a
35 definite limitation on a publisher's liability. The Act departs
36 from this approach in recognition of the fact that a person can
37 be injured by a publication of which he or she is unaware.
32
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1 A principal reason that a one-year "discovery" statute
2 of limitations is used is that the Act covers private as well as
3 media defamation. With a media defamation, such as one that
4 occurs in a local newspaper, a discovery provision should have no
5 significant effect in most cases, as it should be interpreted as
6 justifying the conclusion that the plaintiff "should have known"
7 of the story at the time of its publication in the newspaper.
8 Purely private defamations, however, are more often unknown to
9 the defamed individual until a later time, such as at the time of
10 a subsequent job evaluation or at the point of an adverse job
11 decision. It is in view of these problems arising in the private
12 setting that a discovery provision was used.
13 Subsection (a) provides that a publisher's potential
14 liability is terminated after five years of the publication. The
15 five-year limit on liability represents a balance struck between
16 fairness to plaintiffs and fairness to defendants. The Act
17 protects the unaware plaintiff, but only for five years.
18 Accordingly, a publisher will not have to defend a suit more than
19 five years after the publication.
20 Subsection (a) also limits the original publisher's
21 liability for foreseeable future republications to 10 years.
22 Subsection (c) provides that the statute of limitations
23 is tolled while the plaintiff awaits a defendant's reply to a
24 request for retraction. Although Sections 12 and 15 require a
25 defendant to respond to a request for a retraction within 30
26 days, if the request comes within 30 days of the running of the
27 statute of limitations a defendant should not be able to delay
28 his answer to permit the running of the statute.
29 (Note to revisers]
30 [All or part of the statue of limitations provision
31 can, if appropriate, be inserted in a statutory chapter of the
32 State Code, which sets forth general statutes of limitations.
33 The state's general chapter on statutes of limitations may
34 include a period of limitations for libel and slander, which will
35 need to be repealed and replaced by Section 25 or portions of it.
36 By placing the provisions of Section 25 in the general statute of
37 limitations provision, the ordinary tolling provisions applicable
38 to general statutes of limitations, such as absence of a
39 defendant, the minority of a plaintiff, and the like, will be
40 made applicable.]
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1 SECTION 26. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
2 This [Act) shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
3 general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
4 subject of this [Act] among states enacting it.
5 SECTION 27. SHORT TITLE. This [Act] may be cited as the
6 Uniform Defamation Act.
7 SECTION 28. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this [Act]
8 or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
9 the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications
10 of this (Act] which can be given effect without the invalid
11 provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
12 [Act] are severable.
13 SECTION 29. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [Act] takes effect
14 ........................... .
15 SECTION 30. APPLICATION TO EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS. This
16 [Act] applies to all publications made on or after its effective
17 date.

